

CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CHALLENGES TO CREATING
FORMAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING
CARIBBEAN

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

CARIBBEAN REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CHALLENGES TO CREATING FORMAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN by Lieutenant Colonel Colvin W. Bishop, 121 pages.

Since the mid-1950s there have been attempts to create a regional military force in the English-speaking Caribbean. Although for differing reasons, these attempts have been driven by the interests of the extraregional powers, and at the times of crises, by Caribbean states themselves. To date, however, none of the initiatives for a regional collective or cooperative military arrangement have been realized. This study therefore seeks to determine the main impediments that have stood in the way of achieving this goal. The study analyses the impact of the international system on the region, it describes the Caribbean security environment, and the approaches the countries in the region have adopted in response to the perceived threats. The research shows that there are international, regional, and subregional challenges that preclude the establishment of a regional force. The thesis recommends that cohesiveness among the Caribbean militaries could be achieved through coordination at the operational level.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, a collective security arrangement in this Western hemisphere, as anywhere else in the world must take into account the emerging shifts in thinking and attitudes to threats after the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Though it is still uncertain as to how the emerging trends in international relations will manifest themselves, there is now, an urgency for definitive and decisive action and a demand that states show clearly where they stand on the issue of terrorism. Security in the Caribbean region now, if only for its geographic location, has been noted as being inextricably linked to the United States and is therefore extensively influenced and supported by the United States. Thus, any regional security mechanism for the Caribbean will need to take account of the prevailing winds from the north.

Until now though, collective security in the Caribbean, particularly as it relates to the use of military forces, has come into focus in the main when any of the member states have been threatened, either by external attack or by internal disturbance. The responses to these events by Caribbean political leaders have been wide ranging. In 1984, then Prime Minister of Barbados Tom Adams recommended the creation of a Caribbean defense force just after the invasion of Grenada. At the other end there has been a failure to act, even when strong concern had been expressed about security in the region, as for example after the insurrection by the Jamaat Al Muslimeen in Trinidad on the 27 July 1990.¹ One might even deduce that there may be an unwritten public policy position that the current insular disposition meets the need of the political elite. The exception to this inaction has been the establishment of the Regional Security System (RSS) by Barbados

and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1982. However, attempts to date to expand the RSS to formally include other Caribbean states have met with no success.

Regardless of the lack of action, the issue of security in the region remains one of primary concern to the small states in the Caribbean. On 18 October 1994, His Excellency Mr. Lionel Hurst, the Permanent Representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations, spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries and recalled the issue of the “vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs” that had been raised at the Commonwealth Meeting in New Delhi in 1988.² As well, CARICOM governments and the United States issued a Plan of Action after their summit meeting held in Barbados in 1997. They recognized “the need for greater cooperation of security forces in the region”³ and agreed that “no single nation had the ability to deal effectively with the threats to the security of the region, and that coordination, cooperation and combined operations are necessary.”⁴ Even as recently as 14 September 2001, Trinidad and Tobago’s prime minister, Mr. Basdeo Panday, directed his country’s defence force and law enforcement agencies to review the country’s national security policies “in light of global realities and the escalating threats to the stability of . . . society.”⁵ Both the external and domestic nature of the threat the prime minister defines will be later examined. Thus, it is necessary to vigorously pursue the creation of a viable cohesive security mechanism that can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Caribbean region.

The geopolitics of the hemisphere also must be taken into account. Twice within the recent past Caribbean military forces have participated in operations in the region

alongside the United States: Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1994, and it is very possible that this can happen again. The challenge, though, has been that on both occasions the participating force had to be built from the ground up, and just as important, the motivation to create the force was external to the Caribbean. The after action reports from battalion commanders and other senior officers who were in Haiti are replete with difficulties of command and control, interoperability, and logistics. As a result, there are members of the Caribbean military community who have been advocating a formalized collectivity but to no avail. Nonetheless, in the absence of any definitive security policy emanating from the political level, the military must seek to understand what impediments stand in the way of the collective approach and respond accordingly. According to Brigadier David Granger (retired), former Force Commander of the Guyana Defence Force and then National Security Advisor to the Hoyte government of Guyana, for the Caribbean, “The absence of a viable regional security system may yet prove to be its Achilles’ heel.”⁶

Primary Research Question

The focus of this research is to determine what have been the challenges to establishing a military structure that will meet the regional security needs of the Caribbean. To pursue this, the following primary question will be considered: Can the military in the Caribbean develop relationships that satisfy regional security needs in the twenty-first century?

In order to answer the primary question of the thesis, the following secondary questions must be researched:

1. How and why was the military created in the Caribbean? What relationships exist now? What factors shaped the existing relationship? This question will examine the historical and political factors that shaped the military in the Caribbean since the West Indies Federation in 1958 and the current collective security arrangements to which Caribbean states now subscribe.

2. How is security defined in the Caribbean? What is the current regional and hemispheric security context? What are the likely current and future threats to the Caribbean? How have the events on 11 September 2001 affected security in the Caribbean? Can the military provide a credible response to these threats? Is there any impetus to change the present military arrangements in this present context and that of the foreseeable future? Are the current arrangements adequate? If not, why? This question will examine the geopolitics of the region and the hemisphere and the current security concerns of Caribbean states. The various instruments of power available to Caribbean states to respond to the defined threats will be considered. In particular, an examination will be done as to how well could the military deal with the new threats.

3. What is the recommended relationship? Is the recommended relationship feasible, suitable, and acceptable? What are the implications of the recommended relationship? This question will examine the structure and process issues that will need to be addressed in the formation of the arrangement. The recommended arrangement will be examined to determine whether it could be accomplished with the means available, whether it is cost effective and does it achieve the goal of creating a viable regional security mechanism.

Assumptions

The assumptions below will be made in this research effort:

1. The United States will continue to be a superpower and will thus be globally engaged.
2. There will be no regional security arrangement among Caribbean countries without the support of the United States.
3. Other major powers such as the United Kingdom and Canada will have some influence in the region because of historical ties, relationships based on goodwill and a shifting international security environment.
4. Security issues will continue to exist in the Caribbean that would demand the existence of military or military styled forces.
5. Caribbean countries will continue to collaborate and cooperate on major issues.
6. The middle powers in the region, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, have been engrossed in their own domestic security concerns: Colombia with the drug threat, Mexico with immigration and economic issues and Venezuela with domestic instability. Colombia and Mexico now work with the United States to create solutions, Venezuela after a coup and counter coup, works largely on its own. There is also considerable uncertainty by Caribbean countries about Venezuelan intentions in the region. Thus, in the current and foreseeable future, none of these countries would likely be involved in a Caribbean collective security mechanism.

Definitions

Caribbean Countries. Refers to the English-speaking countries in the Caribbean littoral: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and

Tobago. In common is that all the countries were subjected to British colonial rule and gained their independence from Britain.

Caribbean Military. Refers to the military and paramilitary forces of Caribbean countries. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago have defence forces. Although there are differences in size and command relationships, these defence forces comprise land forces, coast guards or maritime wings and air wings. In the case of the OECS countries, the air wing located in Barbados serves the RSS as an entity. The other islands have Special Service Units (SSUs). SSUs are made up of policemen who serve with these units for a limited period of time. During this period they receive basic military training that enable them to perform tasks beyond that of the normal policeman. They are lightly armed and each country strives to maintain two units both of platoon strength. Training for these units is done by the Regional Security System (RSS) and through arrangements with the United States.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Refers to the grouping of Caribbean countries that was first established in 1973 as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). The grouping has fifteen countries, those listed as “Caribbean Countries” and Haiti, Montserrat, and Suriname. Montserrat is still a British dependent territory. The CARICOM has three objectives: economic, foreign policy, and common services cooperation. There is no collective or other security provision in the existing treaty, nor is there any sign that consideration is being given to amending the treaty to include a collective security provision.

Organization of Eastern Caribbean Countries (OECS). The grouping is Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Montserrat are British dependencies. These countries have a total population of 500,000 people with individual countries ranging from 41,000 in St. Kitts and Nevis to 145,000 in St. Lucia.

Limitations

The military in the Caribbean is a relatively new area of study, and as such, there is no vast amount of literature on the area. Nonetheless, the researcher has access to persons who have participated in decision making concerning Caribbean militaries. Thus, despite this lack of written information, the study will be pursued, as it is important for the development of the military in the Caribbean.

The time available for this research encouraged generalizations to be made about a region that is exceedingly complex. The major issues, from the writer's point of view, have been the ones that were explored.

Delimitations

The research will focus on the Caribbean countries as defined above. The period that will be covered will be 1958 to the present time.

Benefits of the Study

The security issue has continued to engage Caribbean political leaders at every one of their summit meetings. Similarly, the senior military leadership in the Caribbean has been meeting annually over the last nineteen years, attempting to fashion mechanisms that would lead to greater cohesion and to the extent possible, for synchronized decision making on common military issues. Although recent terrorist events are likely to create a

new intensity and even a new focus for security in the region, to a great extent now, there may be a sense of fatigue over the issue of a collective military mechanism for the Caribbean.

This study therefore firstly seeks to provide the impetus to get the collective security issue into the Caribbean defense policy arena, then hopefully onto the agenda of Caribbean decision makers, so that the Caribbean military leadership will be empowered to pursue the issue with the full weight of CARICOM. There is also a dearth of literature on the military in the Caribbean and far less written by Caribbean military persons themselves. Most searches reveal work on Latin America with the Caribbean getting peripheral treatment, particularly since the region has been submerged in SOUTHCOM under the United States military unified command plan. Thus this study also seeks to contribute to the emerging body of literature by military persons, and the outcome of this research project should be of benefit to both the military in the Caribbean and its peoples.

Outline Summary

The introduction to this paper has sought to establish the dilemma that has faced the military in the Caribbean since birth in its attempts to create a regional security mechanism: calls for action at times of crisis and then apathy or plain indifference. The Caribbean environment is not one that allows for easy definition. Regardless of this complexity, the security environment in the Caribbean is seen as being still unsettled even after the Cold War. Many have embraced a broader definition of security that has removed the military from its prime place in the security milieu. New security challenges have been defined that reflect economic, environmental, social, and other nontraditional threat perceptions not only in the Caribbean, but worldwide. Outside of regional hotspots

and prior to the attacks on the United States in September 2001, many saw the world as tending towards peace and the preference for mainly negotiated resolution of conflict. This has led some commentators to question the need to have defense forces in the Caribbean, forces that in their view utilize substantial amounts of these small countries limited resources. This context shapes a part of the challenge to the military in the Caribbean in creating a viable regional security mechanism.

Chapter 1 looks at the historical perspective by describing the evolution of military cooperation in the Caribbean. In this part it is intended to show how and why the military was created in the Caribbean. It will look at cooperative measures at the hemispheric, regional, and subregional levels. This historical outline is intended to serve as the point of departure for the research paper.

Chapter 2 examines the international security context and its impact on the Caribbean, to include the influence of other major powers in the region. The chapter will seek to determine how the interests of these external powers impact on the ability of Caribbean states to shape regional security arrangements.

Chapter 3 will examine the security context in the Caribbean. It will look at how security is defined in the Caribbean and at how this broader definition affects Caribbean militaries. The threats to the Caribbean region will be looked at to determine what would be the roles the military in the new security definition.

Chapter 4 will attempt to analyze what are the factors that shape the relationships among the Caribbean militaries. How the United States has approached security in the region will be explored to determine whether there has been congruence with the objectives of Caribbean militaries. The chapter will also examine the relationships

amongst the Caribbean states themselves to find out if the attitudes of the political elites and the interests of the individual countries so coincide that they would be supportive of a collective Caribbean military mechanism. These attitudes include what view is held about military security in the region, as this would influence any consideration of building capacity.

Chapter 5 will examine the traditional collective and cooperative approaches to security that have been previously put forward and provide a point of view on their feasibility, acceptability and suitability for the Caribbean. It will synthesize the major conclusions drawn from the research, and based on this, would proffer, not a prescription, but rather a way forward that could be explored through further research, to determine whether it would meet Caribbean needs into the twenty-first century.

Historical Background

The needs of the British Crown and the local West Indian planter class in the British colonies had shaped security in the Caribbean up to the end of the 1950s. With the end of World War Two and the colonies no longer being profitable economic enterprises, Britain moved to collectively give independence to her Caribbean colonies in 1958 through a Federation of West Indian states. The Federation consisted of ten territories, all the present former British colonies that are now member states of CARICOM, except Belize, The Bahamas, and Guyana. The Federation lasted only until 1962 though after Jamaica pulled out for concern that federal financial arrangements were not consistent with the country's own plans for industrial development. Jamaica's withdrawal left Trinidad and Tobago to shoulder the brunt of the economic and political burden. This country then withdrew, recognizing that this was not in its best interests. The federation

subsequently collapsed and both islands separately got their independence from Great Britain in 1962.

As a part of the granting of self-governance to the British West Indian colonies, the third West Indian Regiment was formed among the Caribbean countries. The Regiment had its headquarters in Jamaica and was made up of soldiers from several Caribbean islands. The Regiment was disbanded with the breakup of the Federation. The soldiers of the first and third battalions formed the Jamaica Regiment and those of the second battalion formed the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment. Both forces were established on the insistence of Britain when the former colonies were granted independence in 1962. From this historical juncture, security initiatives have been attempted at both the regional and subregional levels, the latter involving OECS countries. The major instances of attempts and opportunities that presented themselves for cooperation will be shared here.

One of the first opportunities that caused the consideration of putting together a Caribbean force was in 1967. St. Kitts-Nevis –Anguilla was a political union in the Eastern Caribbean that was administered by Britain. In 1967, Anguilla voted to leave the union. After the facts were determined, a conference was held amongst Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts and Nevis and Great Britain in Barbados. At the time, the first four mentioned countries were the independent states in the Caribbean. One of the measures agreed to was that the four independent Caribbean states would provide a peacekeeping force. Jamaica withdrew from the agreement, and the Anguillans themselves rejected its validity. After the breakdown, the four independent Caribbean states called on Britain “to guarantee the territorial integrity of St.

Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla.”⁷ Britain did intervene without any Caribbean participation, but Anguilla still eventually left the union.

Another opportunity arose for collective arrangements when Guatemala reasserted its claim for the lands of the former British Honduras, now Belize. In October 1981, the Bahamas, Barbados, Britain, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, all commonwealth countries, signed a pact in which they agreed to consult on whatever action was to be taken in the event of a threat to the independence of Belize. While the diplomatic aspect of the agreement worked, the defense arrangements were never effected.

At the level of the wider Caribbean, there is also involvement in the Organization of American States (OAS). In the main, three options have been considered: the first was accession to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which bound member states of the OAS into a mutual defense pact in the event of an external attack; the second was a “Scheme for Mutual Assistance” which was intended to be exclusively Caribbean; and the third was the signing of nonaggression pacts. The Standing Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CARICOM reviewed a paper entitled a “Scheme for Mutual Assistance” which examined the implications of CARICOM states adhering to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at its June 1983 Eighth Conference of Heads of Government in Georgetown, Guyana. A working group was set up, but no consensus emerged on a CARICOM position. Thus another chance for collective action on the initiative of the regions leaders went a begging. One view advanced for this apparent indecisiveness was that the RSS was emerging at the same time for the OECS countries.⁸

On the 27 July 1990 at around 6:00 pm the Caribbean was shaken when media reports rushed through the region about the bloody takeover of the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament by a group of Muslim insurgents. After Grenada was settled, none in the region foretold this event. The Eleventh Meeting of the Heads of Government took place in Kingston, Jamaica, over the period 31 July to 2 August 1990 without the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago who was wounded by gunfire and held hostage in the Parliament chamber during the assault. The other Heads agreed “on the necessity to review existing arrangements in support of regional security.”⁹ Then Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Erskine Sandiford, felt that there was “a crying necessity”¹⁰ for closer cooperation among the member states. He called for wide-ranging security cooperation through the “expansion of the Regional Security System (RSS) in the Eastern Caribbean to include as many CARICOM states as possible . . . to deal with all aspects of regional security including the interdiction of drug trafficking, surveillance of our coastal zones, mutual assistance in the event of natural disasters as well as threats to constitutional democracy.”¹¹ At the end of the meeting, the official Declaration committed CARICOM member states “to the establishment of a regional security mechanism.”¹² The Prime Minister of Barbados was asked and agreed to chair a committee of Caribbean security ministers to pursue the matter.

After the discussion, an updated RSS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a draft cooperation agreement was circulated to the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago to be considered as the basis for broader security collaboration and cooperation with the RSS. The vision was for a relationship between the non-RSS countries and the system. In response, Trinidad and Tobago in 1993 proffered a stand-

alone agreement that would operate apart from the RSS MOU, and would involve consultation with the member states of the RSS before any decision to act individually or collectively. To date though, some twelve years later, there still has been no action.

The states in the eastern Caribbean have notably had greater success in formulating collective security arrangements, although the road has not been without its trenches. Then Prime Minister Mr. J. M. G. Adams of Barbados in 1979 first attempted to coordinate maritime security patrols among Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The plan was to divide the Eastern Caribbean into two security zones along the traditional lines of demarcation between the Leeward and Windward Islands. Great Britain was requested to provide some assistance. Nothing was achieved for the Leeward Islands, and only Barbados and St. Vincent and the Grenadines cooperated. Today the British West Indies Guard Ship (WIGS) still operates in the eastern Caribbean.

Further, with the granting of independence to Eastern Caribbean countries from Britain came the responsibility to cater for national security. Based on this, joint arrangements for defense were formally recognized in 1981 by the OECS. A defense and security committee was set up to coordinate action for “the preservation of peace and security . . . in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”¹³ This treaty was the first legal instrument that provided for collective self-defense among Caribbean countries. This arrangement included Grenada but not Barbados. Although Barbados is not an OECS state, the country’s exclusion was noted as a major weakness as Barbados had the largest defense force in the region. Therefore, Barbados and four OECS countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia and St.

Vincent and the Grenadines) signed a MOU in October 1982. Grenada was excluded at this time, as other OECS members were much concerned about militarization and political ideology on the island. St. Kitts and Nevis joined in February 1983 and a post invasion Grenada joined in January 1985.

The MOU provided for mutual assistance on a request in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, maritime policing, protection of offshore installations, pollution control, natural and other disasters, and threats to national security. The MOU was upgraded to a treaty on 5 March 1996 after some debate, as there was a concern about militarization of the region. The treaty covers operational, organizational, and policy matters. It operates on the basis of collective self-defense. Article 2 of the treaty mandates the RSS to assist member countries in a variety of security areas, including natural disasters and threats to national security.

The RSS is not structured as a standing force. The forces of each state remain under national control. The treaty provides that each country may assist another member state with security units of varying types depending on the type or the extent of the emergency. In every case, a call for assistance is considered on its merits by each country at that time. There is no binding obligation to become involved. Efforts to upgrade the treaty before this were unsuccessful “because of concerns about militarization” by some member countries.

The lead decision-making body of the RSS is the Council of Ministers, which is made up of the Ministers of National Security of the member countries.¹⁴ A Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) has operational command of the RSS and works out of a Central Liaison Office located in Barbados. There is collaborative decision making

between the RSC and a Joint Coordinating Committee. This joint committee is made up of the commanders of the defence forces and commissioners of police. Only Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and St. Kitts and Nevis have defence forces. The other members contribute Special Service Units.

Since its inception, the RSS has deployed forces to Grenada as part of Operation Urgent Fury in 1983 in support of the United States, to Trinidad and Tobago following the coup attempt in July 1990 and to St. Kitts after a mass prison riot on the island in 1994. The RSS has exercised annually since 1985 with the support of the United States and Great Britain initially. Since then other non-RSS Caribbean countries have participated in the exercises, code-named "Exercise Tradewinds," that are held in a different Caribbean island each year. The focus has been mainly on drug interdiction operations and disaster relief operations. At varying times Canada has provided some technical cooperation; France and the Netherlands has exercised with troops; and The Dominican Republic and Venezuela have sent observers.

Militarily there has been some success at cooperation in the Caribbean. Operationally, Caribbean forces have worked together both in warlike circumstances and in disaster relief missions. Grenada provided the first opportunity. Some 350 members of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force worked largely in a constabulary role mainly guarding prisoners. There was no agreement at the political level, and thus neither the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, nor Trinidad and Tobago sent troops. The view amongst the four was that the matter was essentially an internal issue to Grenada. The Burnham government in Guyana at the time was also opposed, because of their own socialist leaning and

interpretation of the United State-led action as an attempt to stamp out anti-Western thinking in the Caribbean Basin.

Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 and Haiti in 1994 provided other opportunities for cooperation. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean troops were invited to provide support for the local defense force. Haiti is the largest operational deployment to date. All the Caribbean territories either sent forces or supported the cause, maybe a reflection of the changed political climate in the region at the time. There was a CARICOM battalion; and Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago provided commanders on a rotational basis. The United States provided logistic support, as the Caribbean states did not have the resources. The planning for the deployment was United States-led and initial training and marry up of forces was done at Camp Santiago in Puerto Rico for the first and second CARICOM battalions that operated under the multinational force control during September 1994 to March 1995.

There are standing plans that are effected annually to deal with disaster relief efforts. The Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Relief Agency (CDERA) that is located in Barbados coordinate these plans. Here again countries contribute personnel to staff the CDERA headquarters, and appointments are rotated annually amongst the states. Caribbean troops have deployed on many occasions in support of host countries. The region is divided into zones with one country in the zone having lead responsibility for first response.

Currently, the Coast Guards of the region operate in a cooperative manner. There is free passage of intelligence and of assistance in search and rescue operations, and is generally free passage in regional waters. However, a lack of funds and facilities hamper

joint training and this activity takes place mainly as part of the annual United States-sponsored Tradewinds Exercise that is held in a different Caribbean country each year.

Administratively, there has been cooperation in sport, medical assistance, and training. Some activity takes place annually, such as a course for physical training instructors which is conducted by the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force and the Banks Hockey Tournament which is run by the Barbados Defense Force. In terms of training, there is the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course, formerly known as the Jamaica Junior Command and Staff Course, which is a collaborative project between the Canadian Armed Forces and the Jamaica Defense Force. Students from Canada and the Caribbean attend the course that has replaced the Canadian Staff School, which was formerly run out of Toronto. There have been iterations of a similar program conducted by the British Army in Barbados and Belize, but this has been discontinued. Countries attend other infantry and support training on the basis of specific invitations.

The Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) is an annual forum held in different countries each year in which the Caribbean military leadership and the United States Commander in Chief with responsibility for the region get together to discuss issues of mutual concern. The meeting is United States sponsored and is largely an opportunity to share thoughts on common issues and to synchronize action to the extent to which that may be possible. One issue that has been on the table is the development of specialized training centers in different countries, for example have Dominica and Guyana concentrate on Jungle training because the terrain is available. This would have allowed the sharing of training resources for mutual benefit but this has not gone beyond the embryonic stage. After its conference in Port of Spain, Trinidad in March 1997, there

was a proposal that a military coordinating group should be established and that the group should work out of the Central Liaison Office of the RSS in Barbados. Officers from the other Caribbean defense forces were to be seconded to the Barbados Defense Force as staff. Not all countries responded, and in fact, those that sent officers have now discontinued doing so. Why this and other similar issues have remained virtually stillborn is the core of this research paper.

¹The Jamaat Al Muslimeen is a Muslim sect in Trinidad and Tobago that maintains a militant identity separate from the mainstream Muslim community. The group has had confrontations with the state since the 1980s. The main issue has been the right to occupy a parcel of land. The land had been allocated to the National Muslim League but has been occupied by the Jamaat ever since. The Jamaat has attempted on occasions to also encroach on an adjoining parcel that belongs to the state. The state has restrained and removed them both through the law courts and by force of arms.

²Lionel Hurst, "The Protection and Security of Small States," Statement on behalf of the CARICOM countries before the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) at the United Nations, New York, 18 October 1994, 1.

³Caribbean Community Secretariat, "Partnership For Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean," *Bridgetown Declaration of Principles*, Caribbean-United States Summit, 10 May 1997, 16.

⁴Ibid.

⁵*Trinidad Express*, 14 November 2001.

⁶David A. Granger, "Security and stability in small states: The Caribbean Community's Achilles' Heel," 8.

⁷Ibid., 3.

⁸Ibid., 5.

⁹Ibid., 1.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., 5.

¹⁴Ivelaw L. Griffith, “Security Collaboration and Confidence Building in the Americas,” 178–179.

CHAPTER 2

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Caribbean security has been linked to the international security landscape since the reported discovery of the new world by Christopher Columbus on behalf of Spain in 1492. In fact, Paul Sutton, Professor at the University of Hull, England, has asserted that the role played by the Caribbean in global strategy throughout its history has been that which the region has been assigned by the various metropolitan powers.¹ As such, the Caribbean was seen, even in this early period, in the context of rivalry amongst the great powers of the time. Since then, all changes in international relations have impacted on the Caribbean region. In other words, the region is a subset of the world system, thus any analysis of the region must be placed within the framework of the transformation of the international system.

European colonial expansion in the Western hemisphere saw France, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands all move to acquire territory in this area of the world; therefore, all creating security arrangements to protect their possessions. In the hemisphere itself, the United States, both before and after its independence, established a security relationship with the island states. Though the structure of the current international system differs considerably from that of even twelve years ago when the cold war ended, all the historical relationships impact today on regional security. Thus, security arrangements in the Caribbean have to be considered not only at the global, hemispheric, and regional and subregional levels but also alongside its historical antecedents.

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, political science professor and Caribbean affairs specialist at the Florida International University, posits that a multipolar global system has replaced the bipolar character of global military-political power since the end of the cold war. Important to this study, he sees the utility of military power being reduced. Further, Professor Griffith proffered that Joseph Nye Jr. saw the distribution of power as being “like a layer cake” with the top (military) layer being largely unipolar occupied by the United States as the only military superpower; the economic (middle) layer as tripolar with the United States competing with the European Union and Japan; and the bottom layer (transnational interdependence) showing a diffusion of power among various actors, both state and nonstate.²

The new international system that has emerged is no longer shaped by east-west tensions, but it is an environment in which economic issues occupy a central position. Globalization, technology, markets, and the growth of influential nonstate actors characterize this environment. In this environment defense budgets have been reduced worldwide, and the military now plays a supporting role. Security is seen as needing economic and political responses.³ In reaction to these developments, the United States has shifted its focus to crises and threats in major regions of the world and more recently, specifically to the battle against terrorism. Some issues--such as border disputes, alien trafficking, and the illegal movement of arms--remain, though they may have been shaded before by the east-west tension. This suggests that although the Caribbean region is included in the United States security zone, its importance will not be called to attention unless instability creates some security threat.⁴

In describing the international system in the Western hemisphere, Jorge Dominguez, professor of International Affairs and director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, noted that old and new factors have combined to usher in a multileveled international system in Latin America. This system is made up of multiple regional and informal actors who are all influential and relevant.⁵ He laid out these levels as being global, regional, and informal and further proffered that the United States was pertinent to all three layers but the main protagonist at the global level.⁶ This paper supports Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Dillon's view that based on the Dominguez model, the Caribbean sees a unipolar world at the international level and that the United States is the only power that can project significant military forces globally to maintain international peace and security as has been recently demonstrated again in Afghanistan.⁷

In this new international system, Professor Dominguez argues that Latin American and Caribbean countries now anticipate threats from the regional and informal levels only. At the regional level, the system is characterized by disputes and rivalries among neighboring states.⁸ In the Caribbean both Suriname and Venezuela claim significant portions of Guyana. Very recently the Surinamese military forcibly removed an oil barge drilling on behalf of the Guyana government, claiming that the activity was being done in Surinamese territory. This drilling was an important economic project for Guyana. Although Guatemala has recognized Belize as an independent country since 1991, it has maintained its claims for parts of Belizean territory. There are still tensions on the border as evidenced by two major incidents within the last twenty months. In one incident Guatemalan soldiers conducted a cross border raid and kidnapped four Belizeans, three soldiers and a policeman. In another in November 2001, members of the

Belize Defence Force killed three Guatemalan civilians in a confrontation.⁹ In another claim based on historical precedence, Venezuela claims Isla Aves or Bird Island in the eastern Caribbean as being part of her Exclusive Economic Zone. This has obvious implications for independent Caribbean states. There is also Cuba and the unsettled situation in Haiti that raise security issues that have international impact. The possible consequences these situations raise for a regional security mechanism will be examined in another part of this paper.

At the informal level, Professor Dominguez directs attention to the role of private armies that are most often linked with drug trafficking and roam unauthorized across interstate boundaries. This layer moves weapons from the United States toward its southern neighbors and transfers drugs and people from the Caribbean to the United States.¹⁰ Many commentators on security in the Caribbean have emphasized the clear and present threat that drug trafficking and its associated criminal activity poses to the region.¹¹ In the context of the global war against terrorism, United States President George W. Bush noted the nexus between the proceeds of drug trafficking and the funding of terror networks. Illicit drugs have been labeled as a weapon of mass destruction. Caribbean countries provide the bridge between the largest drug supply and demand centers; therefore any future Caribbean security arrangement must address this issue. It is also widely agreed that this informal international threat can be best addressed by cooperation through international institutions and not through unilateral action.¹²

The global war against terror has also raised anew two old problems, that of vulnerability to incursion and neglect of the region by the United States. The new strategy in the war on terror needs the cooperation of all countries, but the United States,

if necessary, is prepared to act unilaterally. Given that countries are certified or decertified based on how they are perceived to respond to the drug trade, for small Caribbean states the question must arise as to the consequences of perceived non-cooperation. Also, with the end of the cold war, the democratization of Latin America and the Caribbean and the acceptance of market oriented policies in the Western hemisphere, the United States can be expected to devote a great amount of economic and military resources to seriously engage Central Asian countries that have assisted in the war against terrorism. For the countries involved, it could be a catalyst for their own development; and for the United States, it is an opportunity to further enhance its influence and stature as the global power. For resource strapped Caribbean countries, this development is significant if there is to be a formal Caribbean security regime.¹³

For Joseph S. Tulchin, Director of the Latin American Program, and Ralph H. Espach, program associate and specialist in inter-American security issues, both at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the implications of the new complex global environment for Caribbean-United States relations are still unclear. Nonetheless, it is imperative that the significant United States influence on security in the region be examined in considering a collective security regime. After the invasion of Grenada in 1983, aggressive United States efforts were made to integrate the English-speaking Caribbean in its regional network. Security assistance programs were offered to the newly formed Regional Security System (RSS) and other countries in the region, and joint military training exercises were also conducted. Many writers argue that this was the beginning of a regional security arrangement under the tutelage of the United States that was geared towards warding off any threats of instability in the region and underlining that the

Caribbean was a part of the general terrain of United States hemispheric security. Today, at the core of United States military policy towards the Caribbean is the need to ensure that no extrahemispheric power could threaten the Continental United States (CONUS) by establishing a military base or geopolitical presence and guaranteeing a stable region to counter drug trafficking and illegal migration. To achieve these aims, according to Humberto Garcia Muniz, Associate Researcher at the Institute of Caribbean Studies at the University of Puerto Rico, the United States has in many ways defined the nature of regional domestic politics, economics, and security policies of Caribbean countries.

Before the end of the cold war, geographic proximity, key sea lanes of communication particularly for power projection to Europe, economic connections, and the availability of natural resources all joined together to define United States strategic concern in the Caribbean. However, in this post cold war period, Humberto Garcia Muniz argues that the military importance of the Caribbean has diminished, and as such, the United States has continuously reviewed its military and security policies in the region. Currently, the principal United States concerns in the Western hemisphere are seen as transnational in nature and have been identified as drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration, firearms trafficking, and terrorism.¹⁴ Outside of drugs, the United States accords Latin America and the Caribbean a low prominence in its security interests. Add to this that Latin American and Caribbean countries are now cooperating with the United States, there are no coups and human rights issues, so that the United States in many respects no longer has reason to care much about the region and can shift its resources to other parts of the world that engages its interests. According to Donald E Schultz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University and

former Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, benign neglect has been the preferred posture.¹⁵

The United States has sought to strengthen its influence with Latin American and Caribbean countries by encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development. Cooperation has become the predominant theme in security discussions regardless of the specific topic. The hemispheric power has sought to enhance security by strengthening and expanding United States defense cooperation and also strengthening regional and subregional security mechanisms that could serve to deepen regional confidence and foster sustained regional stability.¹⁶ Recognizing that traditional security tactics are obsolete, the United States departments of state and defense now play smaller roles. Economic tools, such as the disbursement or withholding of aid, the imposition of stringent conditions for lending, manipulation of tariffs, and influence over multinational financial institutions, are now used to support political, economic, and security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. Still, there is recognition by the United States that it cannot deal with transnational threats alone; therefore, the superpower has demonstrated a willingness to deal more cooperatively with Caribbean governments as evidenced by the Bridgetown Accord.¹⁷

It is important to note, though, that while the United States speaks cooperation, it has shown a preference for negotiating bilaterally with regional governments. This approach serves to keep countries separate from each other and promotes subregional division and competition. It creates a set of circumstances in which every country wants its own voice to be heard as was evidenced in 1998 when then United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited the Caribbean to discuss what were seen as common

regional matters. Another recent example that bitterly divided Caribbean nations is the Shiprider Agreement. This arrangement allows the United States to pursue suspected drug traffickers in another state's waters once there is a member of the other country's armed forces on board the United States vessel. There is also an overflight clause that permits the pursuit of suspect aircraft. Trinidad and Tobago, without hesitation and with much criticism from other Caribbean countries, signed the agreement first, while Barbados and Jamaica held out until 1997 to iron out areas of the agreement that they believed infringed upon their sovereignty.

Another United States policy shift that has impacted on Caribbean security is the fact that under the unified command plan, the region is now included in the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) which has consolidated Caribbean military activity in the region with all of Latin America and South America. In this larger hemispheric context, Caribbean states are now subordinated to the wider interests of democratization in Latin America, and the elimination of the drug trade in South America. This can be seen through the recent annual participation of English-speaking Caribbean countries in military exercises in Central America such as Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarian and more pointedly, through the expansion of the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC). CANSEC is a meeting that is hosted by the United States to review strategies for cooperation with Caribbean countries and which formerly dealt only with English-speaking Caribbean security matters. At the 2001 meeting in Belize, in addition to the Dominican Republic that has been involved before, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua attended as observers. At the conference Major General Soligan, the SOUTHCOM J5, put forward a strong case for

greater hemispheric cooperation particularly in maritime operations.¹⁸ Caribbean countries no longer enjoy that special relationship that germinated after Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, but must now compete for attention and resources based on United States hemispheric priorities.

Militarily, Humberto Garcia Muniz argues that United States policy has been successful in integrating fragmented Caribbean security forces to work under United States dominance. This integration is reflected through annual Trade Winds Exercises that have been held since 1985, the Regional Security System (RSS), and operations in Grenada and Haiti. It must be noted, though, that outside of United States-led military intervention, regional forces are viewed as having primarily an internal security role and a limited role in counternarcotics. Therefore support for the military in the Caribbean must be put in the new overall policy context in which organizations must compete for resources based on governmental priorities. In fact, the focus for United States funding is now on building strong law enforcement capacity. Consequently, while the military dominance of the United States will provide comfort in one sense to Caribbean governments, it is likely to discourage any real initiatives to establish a Caribbean regional security mechanism.

After reducing its presence in the Caribbean in the mid-twentieth century, Great Britain adopted a policy of selective reengagement in the late 1980s. Sutton argues that this is due in large measure to the special relationship that exists between the United States and Great Britain, a relationship in which the United States has pressed for greater British involvement in the region, and which has resulted in a renewed British commitment to Caribbean security. The main focus of the British security effort has been

the defense and internal security of its dependent territories, the maintenance of the freedom of navigation in Caribbean waters in peace and in war, provision of training and equipment to military and police forces, utilization of the area for naval training, provision of defense assistance to Belize, and the denial of the region as a center for the production and transshipment of drugs for markets in Europe and the United States.¹⁹

The major British security contribution in the region is to the Regional Security System in the eastern Caribbean that was described in the first chapter. Great Britain is a major provider of training, mainly to police forces as security in this region is seen as a matter of policing rather than in the traditional sense that requires purely military forces as there is no perception of an external threat. Given the obvious capability limitations of the RSS, Great Britain is one of the countries that has itself committed to provide assistance in the event of any large-scale aggression against the countries. Great Britain is also involved in the operations of the RSS Central Liaison Office in Barbados, contributes to the maintenance of coast guard bases in the eastern Caribbean region, and participates in RSS exercises.

Great Britain also provides military assistance to the other independent Caribbean territories. These programs include training at British defense establishments in the United Kingdom and the sale of military equipment and exchange programs. The largest program is the annual troop exchange with the Jamaica Defense Force. Many countries continue to utilize the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst to provide basic officer training, although costs have become prohibitive to Caribbean countries. Other developmental assistance has been extended to the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force in the setting up of an engineer battalion in 1999. Since then there has been follow-on

engineer training in Great Britain. There is also an arrangement with the government of Belize that in the event of a threat to its territorial integrity from Guatemala, that Great Britain will “participate in consultation with the Belize government leading to an appropriate response.”²⁰

Although British security involvement in the Caribbean is under review, it is likely to continue to be involved in the defense of the dependent territories, the war on drugs, the provision of military assistance, and support for closer regional military cooperation. Great Britain is also an observer at Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC). Professor Sutton is of the view that though Caribbean countries are now more acutely aware of the value of military cooperation, he asserts that “a comprehensive collective security arrangement in the Caribbean is not feasible at present.”²¹

French military involvement in the Caribbean is designed to protect its vital interests and sovereignty in the region. There are three French departments in the Caribbean region: the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe and French Guyana located in South America. French military activity is conducted on a bilateral, rather than on a collective, basis. French military authorities regularly visit Caribbean countries to show the flag and also have soldiers participate in troop exchanges normally of platoon size, where specific mutually agreed upon training is conducted. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, French soldiers participate in jungle training while soldiers from Trinidad and Tobago attend the French commando school. These French forces also take part in joint exercises that are conducted in the region with other extraterritorial military forces. Recently, there has also been an upsurge of cultural exchanges as well. France is an observer at the CANSEC but does not at this time contribute to the upkeep of the RSS.

However, it is proffered that given a willingness by the United States to allow other extraterritorial powers room in the region largely to share in the effort against drug trafficking, one might see greater French involvement. A key obstacle to this is noted to be the French military culture that still defines the security issue in the traditional sense; thus there is a preference to contribute intelligence and other technical support to the drug effort rather than military forces.²²

Canada's involvement in Caribbean security has lessened in the post-cold war period and is now relatively small compared to the United States and Great Britain. This may be attributable to Canadian domestic politics, where there have been calls for a cut back on defense spending and more importantly, according to H. P. Klepak, is the fact that the region is not seen as a priority for Canadian security planners. Canada, though, still provides some military training and contributes to the drug effort in the region. Caribbean commissioned and noncommissioned officers and soldiers attend Canadian courses ranging from senior staff college to individual soldier skill courses. There is also the joint staff school project in Jamaica. In terms of the drug effort, the preferred option has been to provide assistance from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canada views the drug problem as essentially creating social and health issues that require education and a response from law enforcement with the military having only a minor role. Given the downsizing of the military in Canada and vociferous internal domestic pressures, the author sees it as unlikely that Canada would commit to a regional security mechanism beyond her present contribution. Canada is also an observer at CANSEC.²³

Since the year 2000, the Peoples Republic of China has begun to enter the Caribbean security arena offering donations of equipment and training courses for senior

officers. For the first time, officers from Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago were among nineteen officers from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the Pacific to attend a course for English-speaking officers at the National Defense University of the Peoples Liberation Army in Beijing, China. Offers to attend courses have been extended in 2002 as well. A range of equipment has been donated to Trinidad and Tobago, and negotiations for donations have been held with Guyana. A hospital has been constructed and equipped in Suriname, and there is an offer to construct and equip another medical facility in Trinidad and Tobago. Given regional complexities, it is very doubtful that China will play any role in the development of a regional security mechanism in this hemisphere.

The international security environment is changing so quickly that policy now virtually has to be made on the move. With the Caribbean seeing a unipolar world, the overarching presence of the United States will account for many of the national security decisions that are made in Caribbean capitals, although other major powers do contribute to security arrangements in the region. Given this dependence, Caribbean military security policy has not undergone any significant change since the Federation. External security is still inextricably tied to the strategic objectives of the global powers that operate in the region. As well, given that global attention and resources are now and in the foreseeable future very likely to be channeled elsewhere, what is the likelihood that Caribbean governments will on their own pursue the creation of a viable military security mechanism?

¹Paul Sutton, "Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean," 77.

²Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*, 21.

³General John J. Sheehan, "Preface to Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century," vii.

⁴Humberto Garcia Muniz and Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, "US Military Policy towards the Caribbean in the 1990s," 21.

⁵Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and Then Lost Again," 2.

⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

⁷Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Dillon, *In Search of an Identity*, 17.

⁸Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and Then Lost Again" 5.

⁹This information came out of conversations with Major Reynolds Lewis of the Belize Defence Force during the period November 2001 to May 2002. Major Lewis was at the time the Belize Defense Force student at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹⁰Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and Then Lost Again," 6.

¹¹Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, 1.

¹²Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Americas: Found, and Then Lost Again," 6.

¹³*Wall Street Journal Europe*, 18 January 2002.

¹⁴The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, 55.

¹⁵Donald E. Schultz, "The United States and Latin America: A Strategic Perspective," 17.

¹⁶The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, 55.

¹⁷*Bridgetown Declaration of Principles*, 10 May 1997.

¹⁸Brigadier General John C.E. Sandy, Report on the Caribbean Nations Security Conference 2001, 21 May 2001. Brigadier Sandy is The Chief of Defence Staff, The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force.

¹⁹Paul Sutton, "Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean," 62.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 73.

²¹Ibid., 77.

²²Michael Louis Martin, “French Presence and Strategic Interests in the Caribbean,” 32-61.

²³H. P. Klepak, “Canada and Caribbean Security,” 81- 96.

CHAPTER 3

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

Many writers on security have argued that despite the end of the cold war, the Caribbean security environment remains extremely unsettled. Professor Ivelaw Griffith describes the Caribbean security arena as characterized by complexity, change, and challenge.¹ He sees this complexity as arising out of the susceptibility of the small Caribbean states to political and economic decisions made outside of their shores and to the rise to prominence of powerful nonstate actors that can influence state decisions. Other writers add the physical destruction that is caused by hurricanes and earthquakes and the social destruction through cultural penetration.² This complexity is captured more fully by James Rosenau, a professor of International Affairs at George Washington University. He commented that:

The Caribbean reality at the end of the twentieth century is tantalizingly difficult to define . . . The region is like a prism with light passing through, whatever enters is transformed. This leads to enormous imprecision in self-definition . . . and a veritable nightmare for statisticians, demographers, and especially those obsessed with color and race. Nothing in the Caribbean is simple . . . Even the term “Caribbean” can be subject to various political and geographical definitions.³

Another aspect of this complexity that has been more markedly revealed since the end of the cold war is the diversity and differentiation of the hemisphere and its subregions and even amongst the English-speaking Caribbean countries themselves. Differences in geographic location, political and strategic placement, political-power resources and national capabilities, and the kinds of threats countries face all evoke varied responses from individual nations.⁴ To the extent these differences affect how countries approach issues, Professor Jorge Dominguez has described the Caribbean “as a

set of islands with their backs to the sea and to each other. Even some of the countries on the mainland--whether Guyana or Venezuela--could be described as islands surrounded by land, and equally marked for having turned their backs on their neighbors.’⁵ This issue will have to be further examined in terms of determining not only the shape and form of any security arrangement but also which Caribbean countries are likely to participate.

Before proceeding further it is imperative that exactly what the term security implies and specifically what it connotes for the Caribbean be determined. How secure a country or individual feels is largely a matter of perception. Both subjective and objective judgments inform this perception; therefore, the term security does not lend itself to universal definition. In W. B. Gallie’s words, it is an “essentially contested concept.”⁶ For Richard J. Bloomfield, a former United States Foreign Service officer, the concept is driven by a state’s geographic location, interests, and prejudice; and it provides the filter through which problems are perceived and thus how their solutions are structured.⁷

The traditional approach to security focuses on sovereign states as the units of analysis. States are viewed as rational actors who wield power in order to control their environment and pursue their own interests even if this means reducing the security of other states. This approach emphasizes the military instrument of power and is aimed at threats that are outside of one’s own border. Today, this view is criticized because it assumes that states will always act rationally, for neglecting influential nonstate actors and for its narrow power-centered view. The traditional approach also disregards economic factors that now dominate the relationship between states, particularly where there are power asymmetries as among Caribbean countries and the United States and as among Caribbean states themselves, relative as they may be. These comments are

attributable to a changed international security environment where “lower-order” concerns are now to the forefront and where there is the recognition that military solutions on their own are inadequate to respond to this shift. As a result, the traditional approach has been broadened to take cognizance of other security issues, especially such issues that affect small states as in the Caribbean.

Supporters of this broadened or post-realist view of security proffer that the traditional view cannot deal effectively with these complex transnational challenges to security. Professor Griffith notes that James Rosenau refers to these new challenges as interdependence issues in that they are “distinguished from conventional issues by the fact that they span national boundaries and thus cannot be addressed, much less resolved, through actions undertaken only at the national or local level.”⁸ Issues, such as the drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, the flow of immigrants, international terrorism, economic and political challenges, destabilizing international capital movement, the loss of jobs due to the universal trend toward open markets, and environmental degradation all make up this new threat agenda. Griffith also underlines the multidimensional nature of security in this context and thus offers a definition as being the “protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values.”⁹

As was noted in the last chapter, this new paradigm does not completely reject the validity of the realist view. Rather, it acknowledges that internal security issues are important in their own right, and that these domestic matters often intricately combine and magnify external threats in ways that make what is internal and what is external

almost indistinguishable. Caribbean countries must therefore pay attention to both traditional and nontraditional threats. Put another way by the Prime Minister of Grenada, CARICOM must “redefine the concept of security and consequently the concept of defense.”¹⁰

Other than Belize and Guyana that have outstanding claims to their territory by neighboring countries, one of the significant features of the Caribbean today is that there is no major threat of a military nature from the traditional perspective. As a consequence, this aspect of security is given little weight, or if at all considered relevant, by Caribbean leaders. Adding the capacity limitations of small Caribbean states, leaders share a preference for negotiating settlements to problems. Caribbean governments place much importance on adherence to the norms of international law and on the utilization of international organizations. These are seen as key elements in reducing their own vulnerability to whatever external military threat that may arise.¹¹ The Bridgetown Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action put out in 1997 is the result of this approach.

In the post-Cold War environment, with the exception of Cuba, the principal threats for the Caribbean are to be found in the nontraditional areas. Writers agree that although the Caribbean has lost much of its military significance, the region figures prominently in the new security agenda that is dominated by the war on drugs. Today, Caribbean states recognize that the threat from the illegal trafficking and the abuse of drugs, together with its associated criminal behavior, constitutes a major nonmilitary threat to the state itself.¹² Griffith notes that both the problems and consequences of the drug phenomenon are multifaceted. He argues that there are political, military, and economic issues that arise out of the need to protect and develop individuals as well as

state and nonstate entities in the hemisphere. He sees the phenomenon as involving drug production, consumption and abuse, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption, and money laundering. Amongst the range of new security concerns that have been identified above, in the current environment, Griffith sees drug trafficking as the activity that best highlights the region's strategic value, both from the demand and supply sides.¹³

The Drug Challenge

The Caribbean's geographic position--particularly that of the smaller eastern Caribbean countries--its modern communications, its island topography, and its political linkages all facilitate drug-trafficking operations. The location of the Caribbean easily sells it as a strategic gateway to all the Americas and Europe. The fact that the region is accessible by modern air and sea carriers makes it ideal as the link between the major drug supply sources in South America and the drug demand centers in North America and Europe. The region's island character permits entry from any number of approaches. The Bahamas provides a suitable example in that the country is made up of 700 islands and 2,000 cays. The French, British, and Dutch still have dependent territories in the Caribbean. French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique are French Departments. Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands are British dependencies. Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao are a part of the Netherlands. One island is named St. Martin and St. Marten, as it is divided between the French and the Dutch. These political connections provide customs, immigration, and transportation arrangements that allow easy movement of citizens, money, arms, and drugs.

While marijuana, cocaine, and heroin are all consumed in the Caribbean, only marijuana is produced in the region. Today, Jamaica is listed as the largest Caribbean producer and exporter of marijuana. Significant marijuana crops are also grown in Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. This marijuana is produced for both export and local consumption. Demand in the United States and the difficult economic circumstances in Caribbean countries combine and contribute to the creation of a profitable marijuana enterprise. Based on the supply reduction strategies, production facilities are attacked in eradication operations that involve a combination of local military and law enforcement and at times United States agencies. One such action is Operation Weedeater that has been conducted since the 1990s in Trinidad and Tobago and other Caribbean islands, and which had been very successful in interrupting production. Capacity limitations and interagency cooperation still remain troubling though, and Caribbean officials express a high level of concern for drug production as a national security threat. In fact Manuel Esquivel, a former prime minister of Belize, at one time believed the drug issue to be a greater threat to Belize than the Guatemalan territorial claims against his country.¹⁴

Arms trafficking, corruption, and money laundering are often major spin-off activities that support the drug trade; but in themselves, they present security threats to Caribbean countries. One case of arms trafficking that rocked the Caribbean was the implication of the commander of the Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force and the son of the country's Prime Minister in facilitating a weapons transfer to the Medellin drug cartel in Columbia. In this matter, a businessman developed a relationship with Vere Bird, Junior, the son of the Prime Minister. Through this relationship the businessman acquired

documentation that showed that he was authorized by the Antigua and Barbuda government to arrange the purchase of assault rifles for the Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force. The weapons were found in Columbia when government forces there conducted a raid against the cartel.¹⁵

Drug corruption not only undermines the credibility of public officials and agencies but also impairs a government's ability to effectively look after the public interests. Griffith points out that the interests of the state become subordinated to the financial dictates of individuals and groups. He also asserts that there is a subsequent loss of confidence by citizens either in the government as a whole or in the institutions of the state. There are many examples where this has been the case in the Caribbean. In 1986 there was an enquiry in Trinidad and Tobago that implicated numerous policemen and other officials in facilitating drug operations. The report noted that "several members of the Police Service have become involved in many ways in illegal drug use, and in its trade" including the "recycling of confiscated drugs . . . the operation of protection rackets whereby major drug dealers are assisted in or allowed to pursue their illegal trade without let or hindrance."¹⁶ Since that report there have been other police involvement in drug-related murder. In one event the policeman used his status to gain entry for his gang to enter a house and murder four persons. The policeman turned state witness. His evidence greatly assisted in the prosecution and the eventual conviction and hanging of nine other individuals who were involved in the crime. He himself was killed by unknown gunmen. Though there has been no action against any member of the police service in 2001 for drug-related corruption, the service has not recovered its credibility.

Thus while it is believed that this rogue element has always been in the minority, the entire Police Service has been indicted.

There are an immense number of adverse effects that emanate from the drug trade that impact negatively on economic sectors that are crucial for Caribbean states. With the erosion of preferential trading arrangements that were enjoyed by some Caribbean states, tourism has become a significant driver in the economic development of these countries. The growth of this industry, however, is threatened by the pervasive nature of the increase in drug trafficking, the abuse of drugs, and the criminal behavior that is associated with trafficking. The affected governments view this not only as a threat to tourism, but as a threat to the state itself.¹⁷

Some countries have diversified their economies and have gone into offshore banking to attract foreign exchange. Banks offer no tax or low tax arrangements as in the case of Barbados. These same facilities though can be used by drug organizations to launder money. One result was that the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation blacklisted a number of eastern Caribbean countries without the countries having any opportunity for input into an enquiry because they had established these banking facilities. Caribbean airlines have also been subjected to heavy fines when drugs have been found aboard their aircraft on arrival at United States airports. These airlines, already struggling to compete and remain viable and in many instances supported by the state, are hard put by this action. Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago are among Caribbean countries that have been affected. A reputation as a drug-carrying airline can drive away passengers and at the same time drive costs up because of additional security

measures. It also means that when governments have to subsidize airlines and other drug-related measures, resources are directed away from other social issues.

The Economic Challenge

According to Anthony T. Bryan, professor of International Relations at the University of Miami, there is a widespread official and public perception in the Caribbean that economic vulnerability is at the core of the region's insecurity.¹⁸ The problems that are linked to the global economy present some of the gravest security threats to Caribbean countries. Jorge I. Dominguez has argued that globalization is not a new concept in the Caribbean. This region has been integrated into the world economy since its was claimed by Columbus in the fifteenth century. This connection had its own structures for economic protection that served the colonial interests at the time. With the end of the Cold War and the introduction of new rules of trade, the major trading powers no longer "shield . . . the economies of the Caribbean from the gale winds of international market forces."¹⁹ Caribbean countries have limited domestic markets and open economies and are highly dependent on trade in one or two primary products that are destined for the now-restricted North American and European markets. As a result, he has further argued that Caribbean economies are made more vulnerable internationally by the establishment and subsequent effect of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). NAFTA groups the United States, Canada, and Mexico and thus has reduced the value of the trade preferences under the Reagan Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Canadian-Caribbean Agreement. In addition, the strong complaints against the holdover arrangements as the Lome Convention with Europe and the refusal of the United States Congress to grant NAFTA parity to Caribbean countries, have put Caribbean economies

in further jeopardy. An example of this has been the action against the European Union's "Banana Regime" in the World Trade Organization and its implications for stability and security in banana-exporting OECS countries to include the likely migration by citizens of that subregion in search of greener pastures.

In the Bridgetown Declaration of Principles, Caribbean governments strongly noted that high foreign debt burdens still hinder the development of some countries in the region.²⁰ High debt burdens can jeopardize internal security because of labor, business, and other reactions that are brought on when countries need to adopt stringent fiscal and monetary measures and need to use a substantial part of its earnings to service these commitments. An example of this was seen in Trinidad and Tobago when, after the collapse of world oil prices and the onset of a recession, the government through structural adjustment programs reduced the salaries of public officers by 10 percent, increased personal taxation, and reduced its workforce. These measures caused much complaint and protest in the country. In Guyana, during 1988 and 1989, there was muted dissatisfaction expressed by opposition parties to the International Monetary Fund inspired "Vampire Budget" that had many strictures, and Jamaica saw violent public protest after the hike in gas prices in 1999.¹ The consequences of these unstable conditions include the risk of an increase in crime and the shaking of investor confidence, which has further negative consequences for the country's security environment.

The Migration Challenge

While illegal migration in the Caribbean has been focused mainly on Cuba and Haiti, it is a problem that threatens the entire Caribbean region. Many writers categorize illegal immigration generally as either being driven by political instability or a search for

economic opportunity. Cuba fits the former, but all of the Caribbean will contribute to the latter. Still others see migration as the response of labor to the needs of capital accumulation in the developed world.² Lilian Bobea argues though, that over the past twenty years, immigration has been stimulated because the social and economic conditions for the majority of the populations in the region have deteriorated due to the globalization of production and macroeconomic reform. She also argues that migration in this hemisphere has to be looked at both in terms of persons moving to the United States and within the Caribbean region itself, particularly from poorer to wealthier countries. She further posits that the migration phenomenon underlines the inability of Caribbean states to guarantee the social, economic and political security of their citizens.³

Bobea suggests that in the main, the illegal movement of persons has been seen as a security threat because of a strong sentiment against immigration in the receiving countries and the fact that it undermines the laws of countries. The strong anti-immigration feeling is fuelled by difficult economic and social conditions in the receiving countries that have been created by an increase in unemployment and a decline in incomes. Ramon Grosfoguel adds that in the United States and in Europe, there is a perception that foreign immigrants are taking jobs away from the established population and that they are also abusing social services. Also in the United States there are concerns about increasing foreign-born populations and ethnic fundamentalism, further driven by the recent terror events and the threats of new terror attacks since 11 September 2001. There is also a public perception that links crime and drug trafficking to illegal immigrants who can be exploited in their desperate search for a better life. Therefore it is believed that any large and sudden movement of people from the Caribbean must not

only be curtailed, but that those persons must be repatriated.⁴ On the other side, Caribbean governments are concerned about how their limited economic capacity and their already strained public and social services will be able to cope with the influx of returning migrants. This is another concern that was registered by Caribbean governments at the 1997 United States-Caribbean Summit held in Barbados.

Migration presents a plethora of other security challenges for Caribbean states. Firstly, illegal immigration erodes the ability of relatively better-off countries to allow legal immigration, thus easing tensions in the sending state and by extension easing tensions in the region. In the 1980s and onward, the situation was so acute for Trinidad and Tobago that combined military, immigration, and police teams had to be used to locate illegal aliens. More recently it was discovered that the Caribbean was one leg of a network that smuggles immigrants to the United States. The challenge though, like drug trafficking, is that all persons in transit do not continue the journey.

Secondly, the United States, Britain, and Canada are deporting undocumented aliens and legal aliens that have been convicted of criminal offences. Between 1993 and 1996 more than 5,000 deportees were returned to Jamaica, most of them because of drug related crimes.⁵ This policy has reduced the amount of remittances from persons who would have worked and sent cash to families in their home countries and has contributed to an increase in unemployment and probably to an upsurge in violent crime in Caribbean countries. This has strained the already meager resources of law enforcement agencies as these deportees use their “expert” knowledge on their return to the Caribbean.⁶ In some cases, deportees have no family or relatives in the country to which they have been deported, and they have no linkages to the country since they have been living in the

United States from a young age. Caribbean governments have raised this matter both during the 1997 Caribbean-United States Bridgetown summit and before the Organization of American States committee on the special security concerns of small island states on 5 April 2000.

Thirdly, the loss of its intellectuals who are seeking greener pastures and the transferring of capital by persons moving abroad adversely affect Caribbean states. Both of these factors of production are needed for the economic and social development of states. These conditions retard the advancement of Caribbean countries and decrease the likelihood of significant economic improvement in the region. Once these conditions persist, it is argued that the movement of people, both legal and otherwise, is likely to continue in the future without any interruption.⁷

The Environmental Challenge

The Caribbean region is vulnerable to several forms of natural and industrial disasters. As noted before, in the broader postrealist definition, security is multidimensional in scope and includes the environmental element. This aspect of security is of concern especially with regard to the economic security of many countries in the region. The livelihood of many eastern Caribbean states is founded largely on agriculture, fisheries, and tourism. The adverse impact of natural disasters (hurricanes, volcanoes, floods, and droughts) on their economies and on the fabric of their societies is significant as any of these can cause immediate devastation, loss of life, and extensive damage to property that can lead to the disruption of key sectors of the total economy for protracted periods of time. Many eastern Caribbean politicians have lamented that there are more deaths and destruction from hurricanes than from any other identified threat.

Ambassador Lionel Hurst, The Permanent Representative of Antigua and Barbuda to the Organization of American States, also draws attention to global warming as a major threat since it destroys natural resources and therefore threatens both environmental and economic security. Beaches that are essential for tourism can be washed away, and therefore for Caribbean countries, according to Dominguez, changes in the global climate are as important as the effects of nuclear war. He also calls attention to deforestation and land erosion and the impact of HIV/AIDS on tourism.⁸ As well, the impact of HIV/AIDS on long-term development, increased health costs, the destabilization of society and the economy, and the decimation of the region's human resource must be noted.

Trinidad and Tobago, as one of the most industrialized Caribbean countries, presents a clear concern for industrial disaster. The country's economy is built around petroleum exploration and refining and natural gas as inputs to the production of direct reduced iron and steel, methanol, urea, and ammonia. These industries are located generally in the center of Trinidad. With the development and expansion of the industrial base, housing and other services were set up to support the industrial park. Arrangements have been ongoing to make adequate preparation to respond to any mishap of the magnitude that is possible within the park and its immediate environs. Nonetheless, given that these industries are at the core of the country's economy, any disaster will provide a significant threat to the country, both in economic and human terms.

As one outcome of the ongoing discussions at the OAS since 1996 about appropriate responses to these new security challenges facing the region, Dr Tyrone Ferguson, Senior Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations at the University of

the West Indies, delivered the keynote presentation entitled “A Security Management Model for Small States” on 30 March 2001. In the presentation Professor Ferguson suggested that “security management would have to be a multi-layered process involving structured and coherent actions at the national, bilateral, regional and global levels.”⁹ After noting the inadequacy of unilateral and national level approaches to security management in the region, he proffered that multinational governance must assume a major role. He called for a rethinking of the concept of sovereignty in the context of regional governance of new security and proposed that “shared sovereignty would strengthen capacity and lend credibility in withstanding pressures and threats.”¹⁰

Professor Ferguson also noted that effective security management needed capacity to be linked to clearly defined policy and that the issue of capacity had to be looked at in terms of the technical, financial, and other supportive resources that would be required for national and regional efforts. He underlined that the United States is “inextricably implicated in Caribbean security and should be decisively involved in the management of the process.”¹¹ Professor Ferguson indicated two prerequisites to the creation of a workable model: those states that would participate need to be identified and the determining of the new security dimensions. He suggested that the priority should be drugs and its associated activity, HIV/AIDS and the environment, and natural disasters and climate change. He recommended that a coordination mechanism be set up at the regional level within the framework of CARICOM.

In the Caribbean threat environment today, while traditional threats, such as border disputes, still exist, it is generally accepted that there is a requirement for a broader definition of the security concept to be able to correctly capture the reality in the

Caribbean. These new concerns include the drug phenomenon and its associated criminal activity, infectious diseases, undocumented migration, economic and political challenges, environmental issues, and terrorism. In this new agenda there is very little emphasis on measures that involve the use of force. While there is no completely shared definition of the nature of security threats, the vision of security takes into consideration a number of aspects that go beyond the military variable while simultaneously including economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental issues that are all defined differently depending on one's disposition. Diversity is a predominant feature in the hemisphere. For the traditional threats that remain, Caribbean governments prefer to rely on negotiation and the use of international and regional organizations to resolve disputes. As was seen in the last chapter and this one, phenomena associated with globalization, drugs and other transnational issues blur the boundaries between which issues are domestic, regional and international. What then is the role of the military in this threat environment? Where then is a collective regional military arrangement? What issues demand that Caribbean countries make regional military security a priority agenda item and therefore justify the establishment of a collective security regime?

¹Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, 1.

²James N. Rosenau, "Hurricanes are not the only intruders: The Caribbean in an Era of Global Turbulence," 11.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Francisco Rojas-Aravena, "The New Security Agenda in the Caribbean: The Challenge of Cooperation," 68.

⁵Jorge I. Dominguez, *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, 6.

⁶Ian Wing, *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks*, 2.

⁷Richard J. Bloomfield, "Security in the Greater Caribbean: What Role for Collective Security Mechanisms," 121-122.

⁸Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*, 5.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Francisco Rojas-Aravena, "The New Security Agenda in the Caribbean: The Challenge of Cooperation," 71.

¹¹Permanent Council of the Organization of American States Committee on Hemispheric Security, "Special Security Concerns of Small Island States, Rapporteur's Report dated 10 February, 1997" 4.

¹²*Ibid.*, 2.

¹³Ivelaw L Griffith, "Drugs and the Emerging Security Agenda in the Caribbean," 138. For an update on the status of the Caribbean regarding the effort against the drug trade see also US Department of State, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2001," March 2002.

¹⁴Ivelaw L Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*, 33.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 155-158.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 163.

¹⁷Permanent Council of the Organization of American States Committee on Hemispheric Security, "Special Security Concerns of small island States, Rapporteur's Report dated 17 November 1997," 12.

¹⁸Anthony T. Bryan, "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security," 35.

¹⁹Jorge I. Dominguez, *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, 3.

²⁰Bridgetown Declaration of Principles, "Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean," Caribbean/United States Summit, Bridgetown, Barbados, 10 May 1997.

¹Information gleaned from conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Jullian Lovell of the Guyana Defense Force and Major Paul Dunn of the Jamaica Defense Force on 13 May 2002.

²Ramon Grosfoguel, "The Geopolitics of Caribbean Migration," 201.

³Lilian Bobea, "Migration and Regional Security: Besieged Borders and Caribbean Diasporas," 119-135.

⁴*Ibid.*, 119-135.

⁵Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Dillon, *In Search of an Identity*, 41.

⁶Odeen Ishmael, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Guyana to the Organization of American States. Statement to the Committee on Hemispheric Security on 5 April 2000.

⁷Jorge Duany, "The Fear of Illegal Aliens: Caribbean Migration as a National and Regional Security Threat," 110.

⁸Jorge I. Dominguez, *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, 4.

⁹Permanent Council of the Organization of American States Committee of Hemispheric Security, "Special Security Concerns of Small island States, Rapporteur's Report dated 11 May 2001," 10.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 12.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 12.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

After Grenada, and more so after Haiti, there were expectations that Caribbean militaries would have forged more formal relationships. As has been highlighted in the previous chapters, there were many sound arguments about the benefits of cooperation in the Caribbean, including military cooperation. In general terms, the approaches have been to create either one of a collective, comprehensive or a cooperative security mechanism. These recommendations include the expansion of the existing Regional Security System (RSS),¹ the Ferguson model,² and the Subsidiarity model proposed by Knight and Persaud.³ As yet though, none of these or any other proposal has proven to be acceptable to the whole of the English-speaking Caribbean. The central question for this analysis, therefore, has been to determine the impediments that stand in the way to creating a viable military security mechanism in the region.

This research paper has adopted an eclectic approach to the analysis. The main framework has been the levels of analysis as employed in international relations.⁴ This approach takes into consideration the need to analyze the relations among states in the region, individual states, and their interests in attempting to understand their responses to their own national security, as well as the impact that key individual actors have had on defining national security in their respective countries. All the military, political, social, economic, and historical factors will be considered within the framework. The research has sought to determine what has been the role of the Caribbean military forces in the threat environment that has been described and what capacity exists or can be attained to carry out the roles. A look at what roles Caribbean militaries have been performing can

be beneficial, as what is now referred to as the new threat agenda comprises issues that have been alive in the Caribbean for the last two decades, albeit that they have been shaded by ideological considerations. The research has also sought to determine what is the likelihood of attracting support, both regional and extraregional, for any type of military security arrangement. It has also been attempting to determine whether a collective or cooperative arrangement may in fact lead to the perception that the English-speaking Caribbean is more secure than it is now and in the foreseeable future.

Collective, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security

As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the terms collective security, comprehensive security, and cooperative security have all been put forward in the Caribbean security debate and therefore require definition. According to Ian Wing, collective security pertains to states rejecting the use of violence among them and pledging to assure each other's survival against an external attack. The defining characteristic is that there is a common perception of the threat and a reliance on coercive measures to deal with it, be those measures political or economic sanctions, or ultimately, the use of military force. The concept, when applied on a smaller geographic scale, is referred to as regional security. The Caribbean belongs to two collective arrangements, the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS). There are drawbacks to this approach. Most noted among them is that states may fail to honor their commitments to the treaty for any number of reasons. For example, countries may look out for their own interests above the others, there may be differing perceptions as to what constitutes aggression and whether these acts warrant intervention, and, key in the

Caribbean security environment, collective security implies centralization of control and a loss of national independence.⁵

Comprehensive security is a concept adopted by the Japanese to describe a broadened approach to national security. The concept recognizes the multidimensional nature of threats to national and regional security, such as exists in the Caribbean. It advocates varied responses to these threats, particularly emphasizing the use of nonmilitary approaches and informal processes that encourage dialogue, consultation, and cooperation to achieve security objectives.⁶

According to Gareth Evans, then Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the concept of cooperative security is concerned with creating a habit of dialogue between states in order to enhance security. It attempts to reduce or prevent the prospects and scope of aggression and enhance joint security among a group of nations through their association with each other. Evans argued that the concept “encourages an open and constructive mindset, one that is less likely to be inhibited by state-centered security thinking.”⁷ Within regions, such as the Caribbean, this approach requires participating states to structure their militaries in a manner that would kindle confidence about each country’s respective intentions. The concept does not rule out collective arrangements but proffers that a country’s “best protective option is to seek security with others, not against them.”⁸ Deterrence is achieved through the adoption of confidence building measures, arms control, transparency in military and security policies, and through bilateral cooperation to address specific security concerns. The approach recognizes the multidimensional nature of the security environment and sees military forces being

oriented towards external and multilateral peacekeeping operations. The major difference between comprehensive and cooperative security relates to the use of force.

Though the English-speaking Caribbean provides many examples of cooperation, such as the RSS and CARICOM and its participation in Haiti, and has a low risk of military conflict erupting, Dominguez has noted that there are challenges in adopting a cooperative security approach and limits to its effectiveness. He has cited the lack of resources in the region to address the principal threats from nonstate actors and the need for a shared strategic vision that should include a shared perspective on the role on international institutions. He noted as well the fact that most of the confidence-building measures that are taken under this approach were designed to deal with relations between states and, as such, other forms of action would be needed to deal with the nontraditional sources of insecurity as has been laid out in chapter 3 and others.⁹

United States Military Engagement in the Caribbean

Chapter 2 examined the international security environment and there noted the dominance of the United States presence in the region. It was also noted that any military security arrangement in the region would include the United States, whether directly or in a supportive role, particularly in the area of financing. It is therefore pertinent to examine United States objectives and strategies in the region in an attempt to determine whether they are in consonance with the creation of a security arrangement in the English-speaking Caribbean.

The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is not designated as a major theater of war. The new unified command plan that has been announced to take effect on 1 October 2002 removes portions of the Caribbean, notably

Cuba, from the SOUTHCOM AOR and gives responsibility to Northern Command (NORTHCOM).¹⁰ This in effect has removed the last ideological holdover in the region where there continues to be an unsettled relationship with the United States. There may be the consideration of a plethora of security issues, inclusive of United States domestic security concerns, in particular, but not restricted to mass emigration and the movement of small arms and ammunition from Cuba, in an uncertain post Castro Cuba. The Cuban economy is under tremendous stress, particularly after Hurricane Michelle in November 2001. While Russia and United States relations have improved, Cuba's relations with Russia have ebbed within the last decade. Venezuela, under President Hugo Chavez, has probably been Cuba's closet ally in this time, but the South American country itself has been beset by domestic unrest and the impact falling oil prices. This appears to be a period of decision, for Cuba itself, and about Cuba as far as the United States is concerned. With such risk and uncertainty, it seemed prudent that Cuba's emerging circumstances would be closely monitored. This change should allow SOUTHCOM to concentrate on its stated highest priorities for the region, which are counternarcotics and engagement with regional militaries.

SOUTHCOM's assigned mission is to shape the region through military-to-military engagement and the conduct of counterdrug activities. These two pillars are designed to promote cooperative approaches to security in the region, but this willingness to cooperate will not prevent the United States from acting unilaterally to any crisis that threatens regional stability or United States national interests. According to General Charles Wilhelm, former Commander in Chief (CINC) of SOUTHCOM, the vision in the region is to create interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, that

in turn will promote regional stability, support multilateral approaches in the hemisphere and foster economic opportunities.¹¹

The SOUTHCOM theater strategy details four ways that will be used to achieve United States objectives: (1) to develop cooperative security arrangements and confidence building measures that reduce tensions in the region, (2) based on the assessed “lower order” threat environment and individual country national requirements, to encourage military forces in Latin America and the Caribbean to develop structures, roles, doctrine, and missions that are in synch with the security environment. These arrangements must show a respect for human rights and the rule of law and the acceptance of civil authority over the military, (3) to provide military support to allies and United States agencies involved in the regional counterdrug effort, and (4) to restructure SOUTHCOM to ensure that United States national security interests will be supported well into the twenty-first century.¹²

At the operational level, according to SOUTHCOM documents, a variety of instruments are used to execute the theater strategy. These range from joint and bilateral and multilateral field training and command post exercises to staff visits, conferences, and personnel exchange programs. These activities are subdivided into an exercise program, a nation assistance program, and foreign military interaction. Respect for human rights, roles that are appropriate for national requirements, and subordination to civilian rule are common threads that run throughout all the activities. Given the assessment that there is little likelihood of an external threat in the region, countries have been encouraged to reorganize and reequip themselves appropriately.

In keeping with this view where United States policy has discouraged a focus on warfighting in the SOUTHCOM AOR, since 1995, SOUTHCOM exercises have moved away from the conventional combat scenarios to center on peacekeeping, disaster relief, search and rescue, narcotrafficking, terrorism, and other similar type missions that are considered applicable to the current and foreseeable threat environment. To support its objective of building cooperation, the command's 1999 posture statement explained that bilateral exercises would no longer be conducted as the command's "objective is to migrate from regional, to inter-regional exercises, and ultimately to hemispheric efforts."¹³ Multilateral exercises are now the norm.

Exercises are also further categorized. There are SOUTHCOM operational exercises that are rarely conducted in cooperation with foreign units. These are designed to test the capacity of United States forces to execute and to determine the effectiveness of contingency plans. According to a May 1997 SOUTHCOM document, operational scenarios might include Cuba, defense of the Panama Canal, and migrant operations.¹⁴ Other exercises nurture interoperability between potential military partners in the region and United States forces and provide opportunities for building interpersonal contacts to facilitate subsequent United States deployments. When engineer construction exercises, such as "New Horizons," are conducted, they are seen as outward symbols of United States commitment to a country as well as projecting "a benevolent image of the United States in the eyes of the most deprived citizens of these nations."¹⁵

The nation assistance program is designed to enhance the host nation's humanitarian and civic action capabilities, specifically the capabilities of its military. Activities include road building, repairs to schools and other public buildings, and the

conduct of medical clinics in remote parts of the host nation. Though these exercises are intended to have a significant impact on the host nation and to facilitate some transfer of skills and knowledge to local forces, “the primary objective remains providing excellent, comprehensive training opportunities to United States military personnel”¹⁶ in areas that are restricted by United States law. Other key objectives of the United States and regional militaries interaction are to provide examples of how the military can play a positive role in Latin American and Caribbean societies and to show “that a modest military presence can and will produce significant returns.”¹⁷

Given the nature of pronounced United States security interests and a general steady reduction in military resources, both human and financial, SOUTHCOM has had to continually reassess its approach to engagement in the region so that the command could focus its efforts. An examination of the overall hemispheric strategy suggests that the English-speaking Caribbean, as a subregion, has maintained its importance only as part of the transit zone for narcotics trafficking, and may be peripheral in the overall SOUTHCOM effort. The English-speaking Caribbean has a strong democratic tradition where militaries have accepted civilian control, even though there have been minor blemishes along the way. Caribbean militaries have the trust of their populations, are generally apolitical and for the most part, are held in high regard within their nations. In fact, the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force had an ample opportunity to take the reins of national power in 1990, but instead, at all times supported the few elected officials who were not in the besieged Parliament to ensure uninterrupted civilian rule. Therefore, emphasis on developing a military ethos that is suitable for democratic societies places

the command's attention squarely on the emerging democratic societies in Central America.

Though United States military spending has gone up after the events of September 2001, it has been directed at enhancing specific capabilities. Outside of Plan Colombia, no significant additional resources have been allocated to SOUTHCOM. The allocation of foreign military financing (FMF) to the region makes the point. In his posture statement, Major General Gary D. Speer, the Acting CINC SOUTHCOM noted that although the allocated US \$8.7 million was an increase over 2001, Latin America and the Caribbean still received less than 0.1 percent of the worldwide FMF program. He noted that generally military equipment in the region needed upgrading and that the allocation was insufficient to sustain aircraft, boats, and other equipment that had been donated by the United States government.¹⁸ For cash strapped Caribbean countries, where military security may not be an urgent agenda item, this resource shortage would likely cause governments to consider options other than a collective arrangement.

Regardless of SOUTHCOM's constraints, the English-speaking subregion remains stable and democratic, its markets are open, and nations are cooperating with the United States in the drug effort. Unlike Urgent Fury in Grenada, the Caribbean response to Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti clearly demonstrated the subregion's willingness to participate with the United States in multilateral responses to regional challenges. In short, Caribbean military cooperation with the United States has cost the superpower relatively little, has not impaired the achievement of its regional objectives. The strategy has allowed the United States to maintain an appearance of complete control

over the area, and unless there was to be a sudden change or reversal, it is likely that this approach would be maintained well into the foreseeable future.

It must be noted that in the euphoria after Grenada in 1983, then Prime Minister of Barbados Tom Adams, proffered a plan for a regional force with the anticipation that the United States would be the main financial sponsor. Admittedly, Adams did not have the support of all his peers, but even then, the United States and Great Britain considered such an enterprise to be too expensive and not contributing greatly to achieving their strategic objectives in the region.¹⁹ Some regional commentators have also argued that in addition to the expense issue, the United States preferred then and now to act bilaterally and make security arrangements, such as the Shiprider Agreements, with each country. Griffith has also argued that the superpower was also seen as not being tremendously interested about developing “too great a relative military independence within the Caribbean”²⁰ as it saw itself, in his view, as “the source on which Caribbean states [*should*] rely for protection.”²¹ Accordingly, there may be no incentive in the foreseeable future, other than circumstances in Cuba perhaps, in the author’s view, for the United States to alter the current arrangements to one that will require the funding and equipping of a military security enterprise. In any event, one United States Air Force colonel had long ago expressed his view of CARICOM troops, when he described the Caribbean forces who participated in Grenada as “a politically important, but militarily inconsequential group of policemen and soldiers . . . none of whom took part in any fighting. Their role was restricted to guarding prisoners and accompanying US troops on patrol.”²²

The Efficacy of Diplomacy for the Caribbean

Both the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas that established CARICOM and the 1981 Treaty of Basseterre, which established the OECS, make provisions for consultation and coordination on foreign policy. In the case of the OECS, there is also a provision to consult and coordinate on security issues. Although these bodies have been used by Caribbean states to consult on many international issues, there is no regional diplomatic structure or diplomatic community. Some Caribbean countries, for example, recognize the People's Republic of China while others recognize Taiwan. Some have diplomatic relations with Cuba while others do not. Thus it must be noted, according to Sutton, that the countries come together "not from the perception of a so-called regional interest but from a close concern with national interest."²³ In fact, one OECS prime minister has stated that, "foreign affairs is a domestic concern and should not be a matter for collective regional coordination."²⁴ Nonetheless, diplomacy has been used as a key instrument for Caribbean countries in prosecuting their external security interests and at times internal ones as well. Such have been the cases of Guyana, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, among others.

Guyana has used diplomacy as the core of its response to the claims posed by Venezuela and Suriname to two large portions of its territory. A look at the Venezuelan case provides some insight as to the effectiveness of the diplomatic instrument to date.²⁵ Based on the claim by Venezuela, Guyana had been prevented from gaining membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). Nonetheless, other CARICOM states that were members of the OAS at the time lobbied on behalf of Guyana and eventually won support for Guyana's position at the organization. The Guyana government had also

placed the matter before the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth and had received overwhelming support. According to Sutton, the government of Guyana was well aware that armed conflict was not in its national interests, given the relative military capacities of both countries.

The outcomes of the diplomatic effort were significant. Regionally, Trinidad and Tobago played a crucial role in having the parties sign the Protocol of Port of Spain in June 1970. The agreement, which was renewable, in effect prohibited both countries from taking any action on the claim for a period of twelve years and encouraged both sides to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At its expiration in 1982, Venezuela refused to renew the agreement, and has since then continued to press its claim. Nonetheless, CARICOM has continued to denounce the Venezuelan claim every year at the end of its Heads of Government conferences.

Another significant outcome was that Venezuela recognized that there would be little, if at all any, regional or international tolerance for a military solution, and as such, with the agreement of both countries, the matter was referred to the UN Secretary General for a mediated settlement. However, Venezuela has continued to utilize the economic instrument of power to deny Guyana unfettered access to the disputed area. As recent as year 2000, two American oil exploration firms that had been granted offshore exploration rights by Guyana, cancelled their operations because of strong Venezuelan objections. In another matter, a US \$100 million spaceport project proposed by Beal Aerospace Technologies never materialized as Venezuela refused to accept the project in the area that they claimed. Regardless, there remains a commitment to the UN-sponsored negotiations by both sides. There has been a noted spirit of cooperation prevailing

between the two countries. More recently, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister visited Guyana in February 2002 and revitalized discussions on military cooperation between the two countries, as well as initiated arrangements for President Chavez to visit Guyana during 2002.²⁶

Similar to Guyana, Belize had been blocked from gaining membership in the OAS. Since then though, all of the Commonwealth, the UN, and the OAS have recognized Belizean independence, contrary to the Guatemalan claim for a substantial portion of the south of the country. Belize had long ago put the dispute in the international arena. However, diplomatic maneuvering had not persuaded Guatemala as easily, and they had not been very responsive to talks. Meetings had broken down frequently. Nevertheless, although the use of force could not have been ruled out, according to Sutton, Guatemala should have recognized that taking Belize by force of arms was not likely to be tolerated by the international community. While talks had remained deadlocked, CARICOM actively supported the Belizean call for a diplomatic settlement, and at the same time, Belize continued to have independent military arrangements with Great Britain to sustain its territorial integrity.

With the military arrangement in place, Belize has been able to assert that they are prepared to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem. Belize's diplomacy has not been dissimilar from that of Guyana in dealing with this most pressing security concern.²⁷ In further pursuit of a diplomatic solution, on 31 August 2000, both countries agreed on a panel of facilitators who would negotiate a definitive solution to the territorial dispute through the OAS.²⁸ Confidence-building measures have also been agreed to and

implemented as a part of the quest for a negotiated settlement that respects the interests of both countries.

Even in the face of inflammatory incidents both countries have remained committed to dialogue and peaceful resolution of the dispute. According to the OAS weekly report dated 7 January 2002, at the Belize-Guatemala ministerial meeting in December 2001 in Washington, and after the incident in which 3 Guatemalans were shot to death on 22 November 2001, both parties reaffirmed that the incident would not derail the progress that has been made to date. Both countries facilitators had also presented recommendations in a release dated 19 December 2001 that were designed to restore a climate of confidence and prevent further incidents in the Adjacency Zone, the title given to the contested area. Among the measures agreed upon, the government of Belize undertook to compensate the dependents of the victims, to initiate proceedings to determine culpability, and to remove the persons who were directly involved in the incident from duty. Both countries agreed that until 22 January 2002 or any later date that may be agreed upon, military patrols in the zone should be joint and that any law enforcement action to be taken in the zone would be observed by the other country's military or police forces. With this approach to resolving the country's most urgent security concern and the British presence in Belize, it does raise questions as to whether it would be worthwhile for Belize to become involved in a Caribbean collective regional military security mechanism, separated as the country is from the remainder of the English-speaking Caribbean by miles of Caribbean Sea.

In the case of Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, there has been a long-standing dispute about fishing rights in the waters off the southwestern tip of Trinidad and in the

Gulf of Paria. At the southwestern tip, only a seven-mile stretch of water separates the two countries. Fishermen from both countries use this area for their livelihood. There have been arrests of fishermen from both countries by both the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard and the Venezuelan National Guard. The Venezuelan approach though has at times been violent and there have been occasions when the situation had escalated to such an extent that Trinidadian fishermen have been shot and taken at gunpoint to jails in Venezuela. Those incidents caused the then Trinidad and Tobago Minister of Foreign Affairs to offer a not so veiled threat to Venezuelan authorities, that the country was prepared to call on its powerful friend to the north to assist militarily if Venezuela persisted with the violent actions. There is now a Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuelan Fishing Commission that has met and determined rules and a maritime boundary for the common use of the area and has controlled legitimate fishing activity through the issue of licenses.

Strikingly appropriate to this research was the Trinidad and Tobago Foreign Minister's tacit admission about the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard's lack of capacity as an instrument of the country's national security and the apparent ease with which the defense of the country's territorial waters was turned over to the United States. Additionally, the national interest focus of countries in the region could be seen here. The agreed Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela maritime boundary also impacted on the security of Barbados, Grenada, and Guyana. None of these countries was a party to the negotiation with Venezuela. Guyana has been advocating a review of the boundary agreement, and other CARICOM states have drawn attention to the missed opportunity to respond cohesively to what some regard as Venezuelan expansionist tendencies.

Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago meanwhile are to negotiate bilaterally for a separate fishing arrangement to regulate the use of the waters between them.²⁹

In addition to those longstanding issues raised above, there have been three internal situations that occurred in the Caribbean within the last five years that have caused CARICOM to offer its good offices to resolve disputes in the region. Firstly, in St. Kitts and Nevis, in October 1994, the Deputy Prime Minister's son and his female companion were reported missing. A subsequent search to locate the couple turned up cocaine with a street value of US \$3 million. The prime minister's son was found dead and the lead investigator in charge on the crime was murdered. Other members of the prime minister's family were subsequently arrested for the offense. The suspects were allowed bail, which was not normal for someone charged with murder. This led to riots in the prison because of alleged unfair treatment to the other prisoners who were kept confined for lesser offences. There was also widespread public condemnation and outcry about government corruption and cries of nepotism that led to a breakdown in civil order. The government requested the intervention of the RSS and these forces took over the administration of the islands' prison service for a period of five months, restored order, and then handed over the facility. The government of St. Kitts and Nevis also requested the Trinidad and Tobago government to send forces, but this deployment was stood down when the situation was seen to be under control. Part of the resolution was an agreement to have early elections through the intervention of CARICOM as a means of bringing order back to the country.³⁰

Secondly, after the People's National Congress lost the election in Guyana in 1995, the party and its supporters took to the streets to protest alleged fraud and unfair

practices in the election. While these protests were underway, the other party who had been declared the winner, continued with the swearing in of the government, seemingly oblivious to the concerns that were being voiced in the streets. The result was an upsurge in the protests, and the military was called out to assist the police in maintaining law and order. This election was taking place in a situation where the winning party had been in the opposition for more than thirty years, and alleged unfair practices had been used to keep them out of power. These mechanisms included the use of the military to intervene in elections under the direction of the then ruling party. Each of the two major ethnic groups supported one of the political parties contesting the election; therefore, there was the potential for the country to be split in two along racial lines. After CARICOM intervention, both sides agreed to go back to the polls before elections were constitutionally due to be held, in addition to other confidence-building measures.³¹

Thirdly, in the year 2000 in Trinidad and Tobago, less than one year after being elected, three members of the ruling United National Congress withdrew their support for the prime minister and thus forced the country back to the polls. The three members of Parliament had made claims that the government had failed to address issues of corruption of public officials. The new election resulted in both parties winning the same number of seats with the constitution having no clearly defined process to break the deadlock. Elections will be held again shortly as neither party could morally claim to have the support of the majority. This situation would see the country holding three elections within a two-year period when, constitutionally, national elections are due once every five years. In this situation, the population has supported the call for fresh elections, there have not been any civil upheavals, and the military has remained in

barracks throughout. CARICOM has again been following the situation and has offered their good offices.

Of note in these situations and apposite to the policy choice under discussion is the effectiveness of the diplomatic instrument and the preference for using the electoral process to effect change regardless of how difficult and sensitive the issues may seem. This is also a demonstration of the deep-rooted democratic tradition that has existed in the English-speaking Caribbean over the last fifty years. Though limited, a more overt role is being played by CARICOM in regional conflict resolution that has helped to reinforce the effectiveness of diplomatic action. It must be noted that at all times the professional military has followed the direction of the civil authority and that modest well-trained forces have shown to be efficient and effective in responding to internal situations. The other side to the military response is that, even in the absence of a formal security arrangement, governments act positively when any request for assistance is made; therefore, given the apparent success of diplomatic action, they may not be encouraged to invest further in any arrangement that, in their view, might bring no additional capacity.

The Impact of Elite Perceptions on Security Arrangements

As noted earlier, one's perception of issues shape the solutions that are constructed in response to them, and this is especially true in the political arena. All government systems in the English-speaking Caribbean have been influenced by the British Westminster system in which the head of the executive or policy making branch, the prime minister, wields tremendous power. The prime minister is considered the first among equals. This person has sole authority to hire and fire ministers of government and

to extend patronage. This leader is predominant in his cabinet. In the Caribbean, some prime ministers have at times also been the defense ministers of their countries. This situation has obtained also in Guyana, where the president of the republic wields executive power and he has a direct responsibility for defense. Therefore, in this system, a country's defense and security policy can in actuality be determined based on the perceptions of a single predominant individual.³² This in fact has been the case at different points in time since the breakup of the West Indian Federation, and it has been a significant factor in shaping the security environment in the Caribbean, particularly since other than crime, there is very little or no public debate or input in defense and security issues.

Barbados provides an example of shifting policy positions on defense and security at differing times by different prime ministers that have ultimately affected collective security in the Caribbean. Barbados gained independence from Great Britain in 1966 after the failure of the Federation. At independence, Barbados faced no significant external threats and did not establish a defense force at that time. The prevailing view by the then prime minister, Errol Barrow, was that in an age of nuclear arms, no country could claim to be secure, and thus left internal security to the police force. A coast guard was established in 1974, but again with the primary task of policing the country's economic zone. During the first ten years of independence, Barrow placed a very low emphasis on military preparedness. It must be noted that during this period, there was a United States naval facility on the island, which was seen as providing Barbados with some measure of security.

There was a change in leadership in Barbados in 1976, and initially, there was no change to the country's defense policy. However, three incidents in quick succession drove then Prime Minister Tom Adams to establish the Barbados Defense Force in 1979. Firstly, at the time, all of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago had established diplomatic relations with Cuba, actions reportedly not favorably looked upon by the United States and groups opposed to Fidel Castro. On 6 October 1976, a Cubana Airlines jet was blown up as it departed Barbados. Secondly, also in 1976, there was a report that a group had made plans to invade the island, and thirdly, in 1979, the People's Revolutionary Government came to power in Grenada. It is reported that Adams became very security conscious and felt "the need for Barbados to have a limited defense force with a capacity to withstand the immediate assault of potential marauders, terrorists, and mercenaries."³³

In 1986, Barrow was returned to power and immediately loudly objected to the creation of the defense force and sought to act on an election campaign promise to dissolve the defense force and leave the RSS. Barrow was concerned about United States military involvement in the region and voiced "reservations about anybody in Washington sitting down and telling me what we should have in the Eastern Caribbean,"³⁴ referring to the RSS that was seen by some to be an instrument of the United States. Unemployment in Barbados primarily caused Barrow to shift again when he was faced with the reality of putting trained persons on the breadline. Nonetheless, he stated that the defense force would be phased out. There was again a change in administration in 1986. This new regime reversed Barrow's decision, and the Barbados Defense Force still exists today, in fact as the cornerstone of the RSS.

Caribbean leaders have expressed differing views over time about the need for defense forces in the region. Some see the United States as providing the resources that are needed to meet any security threats in the region, while others recognize that the United States will be involved but do not wish United States to dominate. Referring to the invasion of Grenada while speaking at the James Monroe Memorial Foundation in 1987, former prime minister of Dominica reflected the views of those who advocate a strong role for the United States. She proffered “that the Monroe Doctrine was an appropriate framework for Caribbean countries to invite United States security assistance.”³⁵ She further put forward that she was confident that the doctrine had been rightly applied and that “we in the Caribbean who see ourselves as allies of the Americans wish to maintain that tradition and uphold the Monroe Doctrine as it has developed over the ages.”³⁶ A few years later after the attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago, then Barbadian Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford echoed similar sentiments. He indicated that if he faced a situation, such as had transpired in Trinidad and Tobago, that he “would have no hesitation in seeking the support of friendly governments in the region or outside the region.”³⁷

Others leaders, like Forbes Burnham of Guyana and Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, who are both now deceased, were not of like mind and opposed the Grenada intervention. Writers have noted that these Caribbean leaders cherished the principles of political pluralism and nonintervention and advanced these within the context of regional solidarity.³⁸ As a consequence, these leaders also believed that to set up treaty arrangements for defense would be in contradiction to these principles. These principles divided CARICOM when it met in Trinidad to deal with the Grenada intervention.

Countries could not agree on whether Grenada under the People's Revolutionary Government constituted a danger to the remainder of the Caribbean and whether the issue should be seen as being internal to Grenada. As a result, there was not a shared willingness to use military force to resolve the issue. Barbados, Jamaica, and the OECS countries supported while the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago did not. In the post Cold War Caribbean though, the political winds have changed, and all got on board for Haiti.

Even within countries, the attitude to the United States has differed based on which political party was in power. An example has been the case of Jamaica between Michael Manley, who was socialist-leaning in the late 1970s, and Edward Seaga, who was conservative and who the United States supported to regain power. Since the end of the Cold War though, Caribbean leaders have been very pragmatic about their attitude to the United States. Some leaders have dealt more easily with the hemispheric giant. At other times, there has been public comment about the superpower's approach to Caribbean issues and even withdrawal from arrangements in protest as a means of attempting to assert their independence, such as was the case with the banana issue.³⁹ Caribbean leaders are nonetheless ever aware of the United States presence and are likely to be very cautious about any arrangement that outwardly appears to subordinate them to the superpower.

Subordination to the United States was an issue when the RSS was created in 1982, as there was a view that the security arrangement reflected the United States national interests over and above those of the Caribbean states. Several Caribbean leaders did not become involved in the creation of the RSS, primarily because the United States

was seen as the sole decision maker in the arrangement and they thus questioned the organization's legitimacy. For some at that time, the real concern was not "the use of force per se, but the use of force by whom, against whom, in what magnitude, by whose authority, and for what purpose."⁴⁰ According to Knight and Persaud, what has been and will continue to be important, for Caribbean leaders, has been determining who should decide what the threats are, and how and when they should be addressed.⁴¹ This issue is also reflective of the ever-present concern by Caribbean leadership about sovereignty being trampled upon not only by the superpower, but also by any amongst the English-speaking subregion itself.

How sovereignty has been viewed by Caribbean leaders though in the 1990s and at the turn of the century has been shifting among the more developed Caribbean states. The approach to the fight against drug trafficking in the region can provide an illustration. Owen Arthur of Barbados and Percival J. Patterson of Jamaica, prime ministers of their respective countries, objected loudly to what they saw as an imposition of an arrangement by the United States which breached their sovereignty when the Shiprider Agreement was proposed by the United States. In contrast, Trinidad and Tobago found no objection and signed on immediately, offering that sovereignty could not be brought into the question when dealing with such a transnational phenomena as drug trafficking. In addition, then Prime Minister Panday's government went further to demonstrate support in the fight against drugs. The government converted a 110 acre estate that had been occupied by Dole Chadee, who was convicted and executed for a drug-related murder, into a drug rehabilitation center and then invited a senior cabinet-level United States official to formally open the facility. Thus, simply put, it can be said

that Caribbean elites have differed on issues since independence to such an extent that these differences have in fact kept the countries apart.

The Impact of Differing Perceptions of the Security Issue

In the English-speaking Caribbean, other than the border disputes described earlier, traditional security threats are given a low priority and are largely dismissed by Caribbean governments as the least of their concerns. The economic aspect of security is the area in which there is the greatest agreement. It is seen as the center from which all of political, social, and internal military problems can possibly emerge. Outside of this though, forging accord on the threat agenda and what should be the appropriate responses have been difficult at best, and at other times nigh impossible.

Griffith underscores the criticality of agreement on the threat agenda; he sees it as the bedrock of security cooperation. He noted that key players, such as relevant political and military elites, needed to agree that threats in the region are common to all, or at a minimum, there must be a perception of commonality by all the countries concerned, if there was to be meaningful security cooperation. He further argued that, while there was a common recognition of political, military, and economic vulnerability in the Caribbean, views differed in terms of the origin and intensity of threats. He attributed these differences in views to political history and current political circumstances in the region, economic disparity among Caribbean countries and the nature of leadership in the region. The synergistic effect of these factors has produced “a strong sub-system identification that defines threats and responses, particularly in the military dimension, in national or subregional terms.”⁴²

Writers note as well, that while the experiences of the individual states have caused them to emphasize different security issues and even when there have been similar challenges, such as military-type action against the state, the responses have been different. The examples of Barbados, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago have been cited. In the case of Barbados, Tom Adams, who had initially opposed the establishment of military forces, went to the other extreme and recommended the formation of a Caribbean Defense Force. This was after two attempts by Sydney Burnett-Alleyne, a Barbadian national living outside of the country, to enter Barbados by force of arms. Adams was also influenced by other events in the eastern Caribbean, such as the forcible removal of Eric Gairy by the New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop in Grenada in 1979.

On the other hand, Dominica, another eastern Caribbean country, saw two attempts by its defense force in the early 1980s, in concert with others, to reinstall a former prime minister of the country through coups. Dominica disbanded its defense force and has established a special service unit in its police force. Since then, the country has depended on others, particularly the United States, to deal with any significant threats to the state.

Trinidad and Tobago was faced with a revolt by part of its army in support of a popular social uprising in 1970 and by an armed attack against its parliament in 1990. In both instances, the country dealt with the circumstances on its own and did not involve outside assistance until after the events were brought under control. In 1970, military officers from within the Commonwealth were part of court martials which tried the rebellious officers and soldiers, and in 1990, soldiers from CARICOM countries assisted

with internal security duties. It must be noted as well that the insurgents who invaded the parliament were allowed full access to the due process of law.

Though experiences have shaped security perceptions and responses in the region, writers generally concur that the OECS states, as a homogeneous group of small islands, appear to perceive the security problem primarily in terms of drugs, environmental issues, and guarding against mercenary attack and subversion from within the state or subregion. Though not cast in that frame, it is noted that for a small country a mercenary threat would be a military problem. Thus, it is generally agreed that because of their limited military capability, some in the OECS have embraced the United States as their ultimate security guarantor. Some OECS leaders though have kept away completely from investing in any national military arrangement viewing any such enterprise as useless and believing that economic issues should predominate the security discussion. Those leaders have been adamant that issues of development and the remedying of social ills should be addressed more urgently. One such person has been James Mitchell, then Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines who had stated:

My government has no intention of releasing one cent for the creation of any regional army or to waste money on security matters in preference for a basic needs program. . . . Fundamentally, in my view, the sores of poverty in our region cannot be cured by military therapy. I lead a popular government and I need to deliver the goods. Opportunities for subversion will emerge when the people are frustrated again. It is the collapse of social institutions that creates avenues for international intrigues. If the people's expectations are not fulfilled through the channels that people like me create, we will, in due course, be inviting the colonels or the commissars. And the more arms we

have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to solve our problem with a coup.⁴³

While there has been some commonality established in the eastern Caribbean, the more developed countries in the region, outside of the drug problem, show a greater diversity among themselves and also with the OECS as a bloc. Belize and Guyana remain engaged with their territorial problems. Guyana, additionally, is concerned about internal political issues and an escalating crime rate associated with high unemployment. The Bahamas, because of its multi-island makeup and proximity to the United States, has for a long time now accepted a United States strategic presence in its territory. Further, combating the drug trade has developed a strong military security relationship with the United States, a relationship that, according to Vaughan A. Lewis, relieved many of the Bahamas security concerns.⁴⁴ Jamaica's major concerns over the years since independence have been political violence and a high crime rate. Trinidad and Tobago over the last decade has had a high crime rate, particularly among its youth population. More recently, the country has been engaged with internal political issues and threats of civil disobedience and has been constantly vigilant about armed threats to the state from within. In this environment where national interests have been uppermost, Lewis further asserts, that at the regional level, Caribbean governments of the more developed states have been content to allow CARICOM as an institution to examine proposals for regional security while not committing themselves to any.⁴⁵

Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, the former chief of defense staff of the Barbados Defense Force, is now regional security coordinator of the RSS. Brigadier Lewis has

been credited with being the creator and the driving force of the RSS. In summing up his experiences at attempting to create a regional collective mechanism, he cited the sovereignty issue, a lack of confidence by regional governments, and a lack of political will as significant obstacles. He also noted an underlying distrust among countries that has been made worse by disparities in economic development and, in the past, by differing political ideologies. The frequent change of governments in the Caribbean has not only disrupted the momentum for creating the mechanism but also has brought persons on board who before then may not have been consulted, given the nature of executive decision making in the Caribbean. He has also cited the oft-quoted perception that democracies tend to resolve their differences without the resort to the use of force.⁴⁶

Accordingly, although there has been general agreement in the region that social and economic factors have been at the center of insecurity, CARICOM itself has remained apart on the security issue and has not as a result developed any common security response. National interests have continued to predominate the security landscape. Writers infer, as an example, that the failure of the previously mentioned Scheme for Mutual Defense Assistance and the failure to prosecute other initiatives over the years could be an indication that military security, “if it is indeed a regional priority, was not an urgent one, except when immediate and largely unforeseeable events dictated otherwise.”⁴⁷

Caribbean Armed Forces

From their birth, Caribbean armed forces on the whole have been small, not well funded, have had to compete for national resources, and have been dependent on foreign assistance for their training and development.⁴⁸ Troops have been mostly trained as light

infantry and coast guard units with some having air elements. The inventories include assault rifles, light machine guns, small caliber mortars, and handheld antitank weapons. Guyana has an artillery battery and an air defense capability, although there is difficulty now to maintain and support the capability. There are neither combat aircraft nor tanks in any of the inventories, but some countries have aircraft that are used search and rescue operations, surveillance, and general transport. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) owns wheeled armored personnel carriers that have been used for internal security duties. Trinidad and Tobago at one time had armored personnel carriers in its inventory, but once they became unserviceable, they were not replaced. There is no military force projection capability, and there is a heavy reliance on extraregional support. Civilian airlines owned by regional governments have been used for deployments in emergency circumstances. The more developed Caribbean countries, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have standing armies, and thus relatively more capability and are able to conduct some limited tasks on their own. The other, the Bahamas, has only a coast guard whose members perform limited land operations. Of the OECS countries, only Antigua and Barbuda and St. Kitts and Nevis have standing armies. The other islands have paramilitary Special Service Units.

Some countries, particularly in the OECS, do not invest at all in the military while the larger islands may spend in the vicinity of US \$62 million, as in the case of Trinidad and Tobago in the year 2000. On average the region has been spending just under one per cent of its gross domestic product on defense. The general trend though is that military budgets have been reduced. This has created a dependence on donations, mainly from the

United States and Great Britain, to fund training programs, carry out maintenance, and make acquisitions.

Donations by the United States have been made largely in the context of combating the drug trade. There are refitted 82-foot vessels that have been donated up until now to some regional governments, including Trinidad and Tobago. In Trinidad and Tobago's case, its large vessels have been dry-docked for repair for at least four years, with no known end in sight. Fairchild C26 aircraft have also been donated by the United States to some regional governments. The major challenge here, again, has been a lack of finance to maintain these aircraft or have them refitted as needed. Recently, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States government had to share the cost of updating the avionics package on the donated aircraft.

At a more fundamental level, even clothing has had to be donated. In this instance, Operation Uphold Democracy made the point. While the CARICOM battalion operated in Haiti as part of the multinational force, it drew all of its logistic support from the United States. When responsibility for the operation was shifted to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the logistic arrangement changed to the United Nations regulations that placed the responsibility on individual Caribbean governments to support their forces, the difficulties emerged. Countries had not budgeted separate funds for this purpose. As a result, for example in Trinidad and Tobago, to get the basics, such as uniforms for further iterations of the battalion, those who had served previously were made to turn in used uniforms that were laundered and then reissued.

Limited capacity also raises the issue of sharing the burdens of any regional military security mechanism. Caribbean security commentators have noted the need for

those countries that are relatively better off to give more to any regional enterprise.⁴⁹ In many cases to date countries have not supported or participated because they have viewed such contributions through the lens of their national interests. Examples of this thinking abound in the Caribbean. The breakup of the West Indies Federation in 1962 has been attributed to the withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the countries that had relatively firm economic footings at the time, because they wanted to pursue their own industrialization goals and national development. Jamaica first withdrew after getting assurances from Great Britain about the granting of independence and then Trinidad and Tobago, because the country then believed that the entire burden of the Federation would fall to Trinidad and Tobago. After Grenada, Jamaica was invited to join the RSS but committed only to future participation and training. Again here, one of the perceived concerns was the likelihood of being asked to significantly contribute both in financial and other terms.

It is just as important to recognize that individual countries have built particular security relationships over the years that are cherished. Jamaica provides an example of these circumstances. Of the countries in the region, Jamaica has had perhaps the longest standing security relationships with both the United States and Great Britain. The relationship with the United States started just after independence in 1963 and has been cemented over the years in many ways and more recently through Jamaica's participation both in Urgent Fury and Uphold Democracy. Jamaica hosted the initial planning meeting to work through Caribbean participation in Haiti. Jamaica, up till now, has been consistently the top recipient of United States security assistance in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Jamaica also enjoys a very good security relationship with Great Britain and Canada. Before independence, the West India Regiment that was formed as part of the Federation was quartered in Jamaica. The only British defense advisor for the Caribbean is located in Jamaica. While British security assistance has been cut across the Caribbean, Jamaica has maintained its annual exchange training with the British forces. In fact, Jamaica has offered places on this training to other Caribbean countries. Jamaica also houses the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff Course, a joint project between the Canadian Armed Forces and the JDF. Again, the college offers places to all the Caribbean countries. Some have argued that because these relationships are extremely valued by both the donor countries and the recipient, that neither of them would want to lose the benefits by having to work through a regional military security arrangement.

The importance of relationships as described above becomes more obvious when individual country experiences at equipment acquisition are considered. Here Trinidad and Tobago can provide an example. Firstly, it is a keen contest to even forge agreement between the defense force and the policy makers on whether what the defense force requests should be given any priority in the national context. Then, if that battle is won and monies are allocated to the militaries to procure equipment, the bureaucratic control of these funds can frustrate the best-laid plans. Outside of personnel expenditure, when funds are voted for use by the defense force, they are not immediately made available to the force. There is a system of releases, where based on the financial health of the nation, an unknown amount of the overall figure that has been allocated will be made available. The worse case scenario with this approach is that nothing will be made available or just as difficult, an insufficient amount. This arrangement makes planning and execution of

programs, particularly long term planning, extremely difficult as the force is never able to reliably forecast what resources would be available. This has been the case for a number of years in the Caribbean, which among other things, has resulted in forces not being able to execute their assigned missions. A viable military security arrangement cannot survive in this environment.

Guyana also provides an example of where financial inattention has had a severe impact on the country's national security. It has been reported that by the year 2000, almost all of the Guyana Defense Force air, land, and maritime transport needs, both for administration and operations, were being provided by private contractors because of a lack of institutional maintenance and a failure to replace unserviceable assets. This included a commercial vessel that was the only one available to the coast guard. This dire situation allowed the Surinamese navy to enter Guyana's waters without fear of reprisal and disrupt a major Guyanese economic project. The event prompted the Guyana government to purchase a sixteen-year old minesweeper from the British government and to sign the Maritime Law Enforcement Treaty with the United States in 2001. The signing of the treaty allowed SOUTHCOM to promise to deliver two patrol craft to the government.⁵⁰

Consideration of either a collective or cooperative security arrangement that is by definition externally focused and that would require force projection and sustainment capabilities appears unrealistic for the Caribbean countries. Among other things raised in this paper, their limited capability does not allow them to provide a credible response to any such threat, even if those external threats are well known before hand. Caribbean governments have keyed on the national interest value of any enterprise and have

appeared to be disinterested in investing in military security particularly at the expense of alleviating socio-economic conditions in individual countries. There are also cherished relationships between some Caribbean states and extraregional powers that could be in conflict with a regional viewpoint if a regional military mechanism was to be established.

Table 1. Military and Paramilitary Forces in the Caribbean

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>COAST GUARD</u>	<u>AIR WING</u>	<u>SSU</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bahamas	None	858	None	None	858
Belize	1000	None	50	None	1050
Guyana	2500	450	200	None	3150
Jamaica	3000	250	250	None	3500
Trinidad & Tobago	2300	800	50	None	3150
Antigua & Barbuda	Regional Security System 125 45 None			40	210
Barbados	850	110	None	None	960
Dominica	None	32	None	40	72
Grenada	None	60	None	80	140
St. Kitts & Nevis	80	45	None	None	125
St. Lucia	None	40	None	40	80
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	None	40	None	40	80

Sources: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Central America and the Caribbean, 2001–2002. Lt Col Jullian Lovell provided information on the Guyana Defense Force.

Notes:

1. Belize has a maritime wing that is an integral part of the Defense Force.
2. The RSS operates a maritime surveillance platform that includes 2 Fairchild C26 aircraft donated by the United States.

Roles of Caribbean Armed Forces

One of the central questions raised at the end of the last chapter is what roles are there for the militaries in the Caribbean based on the threat environment that was described and whether these roles can be more effectively prosecuted through a regional security mechanism. A subset of this, and just as pertinent, is whether a collective of cooperative security mechanism is the appropriate instrument to be applied in this environment. The limits of a cooperative approach were already discussed above when the definition of the concept was considered. The applicability of the collective approach will be addressed in the following subsection. This paper supports the view that what is now deemed the new transnational threat agenda always existed for the Caribbean, though some issues, such as drugs, have gained in prominence and are likely to continue throughout the foreseeable future. As well, given that the Caribbean nations have not promulgated national security strategies and consequently no national military strategies, it will be useful to examine the roles that have evolved for Caribbean militaries in addition to those that have been mandated in national laws or constitutions. For the purpose of this research, the focus has been put on the roles that Caribbean militaries have performed in the period since the end of the Cold War when geopolitical tensions in the region were eased.

The broad cover that can be used to describe the roles of Caribbean militaries is aid to the civil power. Within that frame, missions are internally focused and can range from countering insurgencies, though infrequently, to assisting in the aftermath of disasters and the protection of tourism resources. The arrangements for the involvement of the militaries in disaster relief efforts in the Caribbean were covered in chapter 1. One aspect that is common throughout the region is assisting the civil police in the fight against crime. Though there are guidelines to request this support, there are no legal restrictions that prevent the deployment of the military within its own country in the Caribbean. As indicated before, Caribbean leaders place very little to no emphasis at all on preparing to respond to threats of a military nature. Even Guyana, whose current president, Mr. Bharat Jagdeo, has stated that the military would be provided with adequate resources, though constrained by the state of the country's treasury, has not focused its military on its neighbors. His predecessor, from the same political party, provided a vision for the Guyana Defense Force that has not been retracted, that is a force "evolving to perform a substantial and committed role in law enforcement."⁵¹ Jamaica is another Caribbean country that has found itself with a difficult crime problem and has routinely used the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) in support of the civil police for the last two decades. Some writers have referred to the JDF "as a second-line, regular police force."⁵²

Another aspect of crime has to do with the drug trade. In the region, except in the Bahamas and Jamaica, this matter has remained strictly within the domain of the civilian police with the military offering intermittent assistance. The most consistent support to the police is through the provision of intelligence. Some Caribbean defense forces have

not willingly taken up the fight against drugs as a primary mission and, as such, remain on the periphery of counterdrug operations and by extension United States contributions to the militaries. The drug fight is not perceived by military professionals to be a strictly military mission but rather as one that must have social solutions, and as such, sees the effort as being inappropriately characterized as combat. The police as well do not always welcome the military presence as it is seen as an invasion of their jurisdiction. According to then Lieutenant Colonel Ancil Antoine, this view reflects the parochialism that exists within some Caribbean armed forces and a failure to grasp the complexity of the drug phenomena and its potential effects on the military in the long term.⁵³ His research has indicated that many military officers in the Caribbean believe that the military should utilize its time preparing to respond to the next insurgent threat to national security.

Another role that Caribbean forces are thought to play is that of a holding force. This view has been expressed by a senior United States officer who described the RSS as “a formal framework for a response from the United States and serves as a tripwire on what the United States regards as a strategically important perimeter.”⁵⁴ The same thinking could be applied to the other Caribbean forces. Here national security is not seen as based on the individual country’s own military capabilities. The concept’s basic premise is that Caribbean forces will lack the capacity to defend against any significant external threat and therefore will have to depend on powerful allies. Thus each country should have a force just large enough to present an initial response until the United States can become involved. This concept clearly subordinates the Caribbean forces to the superpower and thrusts the responsibility for the security of the Caribbean towards the United States.

Unemployment and the high incidence of crime among the youth population created another role for Caribbean defense forces in their national communities. Defense forces are seen as able to be role models for youth and to be able to use their military systems of management to impart self-discipline and basic skill training. Two examples of these programs are in Barbados, where the defense force has been conducting a sporting program in conjunction with that country's national sporting bodies to develop young athletes and in Trinidad and Tobago, where the Civilian Conservation Corps was established. The Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force administered a six-month program that was based around the development of the individual, respect for society, values, and basic skill training for trade persons. A separate budget was set aside for this program that was essentially apart from the military allocations. A method similar to recruit training was employed. Members of the force were rotated out every two years. Persons in the program were paid a small stipend. The trainees' work in the program was directed towards developing and maintaining tourism facilities, opening up parks and trails, and reforestation.

There has been no suggestion that any Caribbean government has considered raising a force that could be deployed to support Guyana or Belize with their territorial concerns. All the roles have been internally focused. Nontraditional roles have evolved, but these are driven by the particular socioeconomic conditions of each country. Roles therefore have been internally focused. Is there any advantage to the establishing a formal military security mechanism?

Applicability of Collective Measures to the Caribbean Threat Environment

As noted before, the threats in the Caribbean region emanate mainly from circumstances that are internal to each of the countries, particularly economic circumstances that are seen to be at the core of all the issues that arise. Given the scope of collective security as defined earlier and its reliance on sanctions or force to deal with threats to security, it is pertinent to determine how applicable collective measures could be to the Caribbean security environment.

Richard J. Bloomfield has examined this issue and has noted there have been practical problems in attempting to apply traditional measures to the new threats. He too has observed the domestic origins of threats and asserts that a collective arrangement would not be necessary if governments were able and willing to take strong action against these new security concerns. He also notes that other governments, faced with similar problems, were clearly unlikely to resort to collective measures against another in the current environment. Bloomfield used the example of the United States attempting to pressure governments through political and economic means to take stronger action on drug trafficking. He used the fact that cocaine is still available to consumers to describe this policy as a failure.⁵⁵

On the other hand, Bloomfield has argued that a collective arrangement in the Caribbean is appropriate to deal with threats to democracy. He relied on the assertion by Eliot Abrams that there are likely to be circumstances that will emerge in the region that will warrant intervention by the United States. He has argued that a collective arrangement by Caribbean forces will provide an alternative to United States intervention and if necessary, “provide legitimacy for United States participation.”⁵⁶ He further argued that collective arrangements had not stopped the United States from acting in the past but

that interventions had grown unpopular with the United States public and as such, a Caribbean arrangement might be beneficial to a United States president.

This argument by Bloomfield could well be the death of any arrangement or why any arrangement has continued to remain stillborn. As pointed out before, there is the concern about dominance by the United States of any regional security arrangement. It is very probable as well that Caribbean governments would not wish to be seen as openly subordinated to the United States. The trends in the English-speaking Caribbean do not suggest the emergence of any regime that would threaten regional stability. Though some assert that the longstanding democratic tradition in the region has encouraged a great deal of complacency, one must note that even when there have been crises, such as in Trinidad and Tobago for example, the armed forces ensured that civilian rule was maintained. Again, to use the situation in Trinidad and Tobago today, where none of the political parties has gained a clear parliamentary majority, the population has been patiently waiting to go back to the polls for the third time in two years.

The Question of Identity

The issue of identity as military forces in the Caribbean is linked to both external and internal circumstances. Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Dillon has argued that the identity of the military in the Caribbean has been shaped in the main by historical circumstances that do not allow them to portray the image of a military force.⁵⁷ Dillon defined identity as those attributes that are central, distinctive, and enduring about an organization. It is seen as the perceptions that those within the organization hold of themselves. Image, on the other hand, refers to external assessments of the organization by its key stakeholders, such as Caribbean leaders, governments, the United States as the

hemispheric giant, and the region's populations. Caribbean military organizations see themselves through feedback from these external entities that allows for identities to be constructed. It is pertinent to this research to understand how the key stakeholders see the Caribbean militaries, as this image will be a significant factor in any decision to establish a regional military mechanism.

It was noted earlier that Caribbean forces have had no external military posture of their own. Throughout their histories, they have always worked alongside some major power. In the colonial era, this power was Great Britain that recruited soldiers from the colonies to fight in the great wars. In the more recent historical period, it has been alongside the United States. At the close of the colonial era, military forces in the Caribbean were seen as symbols of independence and as sources that could contribute to the defense of the British Commonwealth. Caribbean countries did not fight for their independence and have been perceived as being too small to meet the security needs of the new nations and therefore have always been seen as dependent on a major power to guarantee their external security. Thus from birth, the image of the Caribbean forces on their own, was one that always raised questions about the utility of their existence.

Dillon further posited that Caribbean militaries must legitimize their status so as not to be deemed as simply irrelevant to the current environment. The image today is one where it is still widely accepted that the defense forces of the region are incapable of providing a credible national defense of their respective countries. Their roles have been largely ceremonial and in support of civil authorities, particularly the civil police. With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean armies have not had to defend their democracies. Another twist to the issue is that in some ways, the sharp distinction that

existed between the police forces and the military in the region has somewhat dissipated. It is common to see policemen on the beat, for example in Trinidad and Tobago, armed with semiautomatic and automatic weapons as part of their response to crime. These policemen are also dressed in military-styled clothing. At national parades they have mounted general purpose machine guns on their jeeps. Soldiers also form part of anti-crime patrols in urban areas. In the OECS countries, the Special Service Units that are integral to the police wear battle dress uniforms and normally are armed with assault rifles. So that in some ways, given the internal focus of national security in the Caribbean, there has been an intermingling of military and police images that puts further pressure on the military forces to find ways to create congruence between how they see themselves and the existing images. The external experience has not served to shift the constabulary image. As noted earlier, participation in Grenada and Haiti, whether correctly or not, has been characterized as performing police roles of guarding prisoners and installations. Images of dependence on external powers for protection of sovereignty and constabulary roles internally are unlikely to lend justification for a call by the military for a regional military security arrangement.

¹Kingston Declaration, *Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community*, issued in Kingston, Jamaica, on 2 August 1990.

²Tyronne Ferguson, "A Security Management Model for Small States," 8-14.

³W. Andy Knight and Randolph B. Persaud, "Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security," 29-56.

⁴James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 22-28.

⁵Ian Wing, *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks*, 41-42.

⁶*Ibid.*, 44-45.

⁷*Ibid.*, 45-48.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Jorge I. Dominguez, "Security, Peace, and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, Challenges for the Post-Cold War Era," 12-18.

¹⁰On 17 April 2002, the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld announced the new United States Unified Command Plan that will take effect on 1 October 2002. The plan includes the creation of Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM's geographic area will include the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and portions of the Caribbean, to include Cuba. Mr. Rumsfeld stated that the new plan reflects the new defense strategy that has been structured to prepare for the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise. For comments on Cuba, see Dr. Geoff Demarest, "Cuba's Transition," 1-11.

¹¹General Charles Wilhelm, *Posture Statement of the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 4 March, 1999, 10.

¹²US Southern Command, *Theater Strategy*, 1.

¹³Defense Department Programs, US Southern Command, *Exercise Overview*, 3.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵General Charles Wilhelm, *Posture Statement of the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 March 1999*, 4.

¹⁶US Southern Command, *Operational Overview*, 1.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁸Major General Gary D. Speer, *Posture Statement of the Acting Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command before the 107 th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 March 2002*, 28.

¹⁹Andres Serbin, *Caribbean Geopolitics, Toward Security Through Peace*, 82.

²⁰Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, 66.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*, 164.

²³Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 10.

²⁴Lloyd Searwar, "Dominant Issues in the Role and Responses of Caribbean Small States," 11.

²⁵Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 28.

²⁶*Guyana Chronicle*, 27 February 2002.

²⁷Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 28-29.

²⁸Organization of American States, *Weekly Report*, 5 September 2000, 1.

²⁹Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector, 1-8.

³⁰Conversation with Lt Col Alvin Quintyne of the Barbados Defense Force on 18 April 2002. Lt Col Quintyne is now the Defense Attache, Washington, D.C. Then Major Quintyne was the officer in charge of the RSS contingent of soldiers and policemen that took over the prison facilities in St. Kitts and Nevis in October 1994.

³¹Conversation with Lt Col Jullian B. Lovell of the Guyana Defense Force on 15 April 2002.

³²Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Security Perceptions of English Caribbean Elites," 4-7.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*, 11.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean – Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, 50-84.

³⁹Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, "Looking Ahead: Regional Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," 206.

⁴⁰W. Andy Knight and Randolph B. Persaud, "Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security," 45.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 46.

⁴²Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 16.

⁴³Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Security Perceptions of English Caribbean Elites," 17.

⁴⁴Vaughan A. Lewis, "International, National and Regional Security Arrangements in the Caribbean," 288.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁶Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis, "Initiatives for Cooperative Regional Security: The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System," 177-183.

⁴⁷Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 17.

⁴⁸Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean – Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, 50-84.

⁴⁹Ivelaw L. Griffith, *Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century*, 61-62.

⁵⁰David A. Granger, *Defense Review: Guyana needs its own National Defense Strategy*, 1-10. Information also provided by Lt Col Jullian B. Lovell of the Guyana Defense Force in conversation on 17 April 2002.

⁵¹David A. Granger, *Defense Review: Guyana needs its own National Defense Strategy*, 2.

⁵²Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean – Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, 133.

⁵³Lieutenant Colonel Ancil W. Antoine, *What should be the Role of the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force in combating the illegal Drug Trade*, 55.

⁵⁴Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean – Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, 166.

⁵⁵Richard J. Bloomfield, "Security in the Greater Caribbean – What Role for Collective Security Mechanisms," 124.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 129.

⁵⁷Lieutenant Colonel Edmund E. Dillon, *In search of an Identity*, 45-70.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The pursuit of military cohesion among the English-speaking Caribbean states had its genesis with the birth of the West Indies Federation. The Federation died, and up till now, so too it seems is the case with a military arrangement that encompasses the entire Caribbean region. The environment today, and that of the foreseeable future, has signaled that states that lack capacity and act on their own are very likely to be either gobbled up or at best marginalized. The situation is worse still for the small states of the world. As has been evidenced in the global war on terrorism, countries all over recognize the need to work with each other, putting aside differences that hitherto seemed insurmountable. The Caribbean is no different in this respect. The issue to be borne in mind here, therefore, is not whether Caribbean states should cooperate, but rather, according to Rojas-Aravena, how that cooperation should be brought about, and specific to this research, to determine what challenges stand in the way.¹

Today, the international security environment is in a continuous state of change. Relevant to the Caribbean, the United States has been somewhat distracted from the region by other events worldwide, and now seems to coordinate security arrangements with other extraterritorial major powers, mainly Great Britain and Canada, in the Caribbean region.² Even as this paper is being written, there are projected changes that have been announced for the United States Unified Command Plan that will affect the Caribbean in a yet uncertain manner. Nonetheless, the research has indicated that none of the superpower or the major powers that influence security arrangements in the Caribbean seem prepared to invest further in Caribbean military security but rather, they

have been building law enforcement capacity. New threats in the region are seen as important mainly from the perspective that they have an internal impact in North America and Europe through increased migration and drug trafficking. Cuba, where what happens in the near future has been the subject of much conjecture, has been placed under the responsibility of the Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Thus the only perceived future concern as a traditional threat has been removed from the region. This suggests a continued peacetime engagement mission for SOUTHCOM and thus probably no significant shift in its approach to building military cooperation in the region. Caribbean countries therefore, if they so desire, would have to structure military arrangements that they could manage from mainly within their own resources.

In many ways, the Caribbean security environment has been seen as more complex and fluid than during the Cold War period. The region has been host to many independent actors, both external and internal, each with their own distinct interests and all having “conflicting economic and political tendencies.”³ Security is seen not in military terms, but more as political, social and economic matters. No one response is therefore optimal. Regional governments have not made military security a priority and seem not prepared to develop military capacity ahead of prosecuting economic and social objectives. Equally as important, the military contribution to creating and maintaining stable, democratic societies has been seen largely as a constabulary role fighting against crime and so requiring no investment in military hardware and equipment.

The research has suggested that it will not be easy to create a formal military security arrangement in the Caribbean based on either the collective or the cooperative concept. These concepts of security arrangements, as they are defined, seem unsuited for

the Caribbean milieu. These concepts rely on there being a common perception of the threat, are centered on arrangements between states, and ultimately, there is a reliance on coercive measures to respond to security concerns. In the Caribbean, there is neither agreement on a regional threat perception, nor is there the capacity to coerce or use military force if such is required. In addition, countries continue to be focused on their own interests. As well, given the domestic origins of the threats outlined, collective and cooperative measures are not likely to contribute to the creation of conditions that will alleviate dire socio-economic conditions. The need for political consensus has emerged as a prerequisite to the effective functioning of collective and cooperative arrangements, and achieving this has proven over time to be very elusive in the Caribbean. In fact, many issues at this level appear intractable and thus make consensus difficult to achieve, and as a result, militate against the creation of effective mechanisms for political coordination and collaboration.

Based on the political dilemma just described, the research also has indicated that an expanded arrangement based on the RSS is not likely to materialize in the present or foreseeable circumstances. There is an immense amount of sensitivity to the RSS that makes it not a practical option for a regional arrangement though it has had a reasonable record of success. In short, from the political level, there seem to be no issues or incentives in the current and near future circumstances that demand that Caribbean governments make military security a priority agenda item, and therefore justify the establishment of a regional military mechanism.

However, the experiences of Haiti, frequent professional military interaction through meetings and conferences, and the annual Tradewinds exercises have all helped

to expand military cooperation in the region and still give hope to the idea of a cohesive Caribbean military. These interactions have helped to build some capacity among Caribbean forces. It has also helped to maintain the image of strong institutions that could support the internal structures of countries. A cohesive arrangement would bring together limited capacities to help the small countries maintain international political relevance for the region. Believing that the militaries in the region recognize the benefits of working together, this thesis supports the view of Professor Ferguson and others, that operational level coordination among the militaries should meet the military requirements and challenges of the threat agenda in the Caribbean, now and in the future. Operational level coordination could build cohesion and further cement the embryonic military practice that has emerged in the region and could provide the basis for a regional response to any international event such as Haiti.⁴

For the political level, an operational arrangement would allow governments to maintain control of their forces and other national military assets. Importantly, there would be opportunity for a dissenting view, though this could appear to undermine regional cohesion and create a vacuum for the exercise of influence by the major military power in the hemisphere. There could be accountability to national capitals and individual governments could maintain control over whether they choose to participate in any action, for what purpose and against whom. This level activity could allow for all countries to be included in planning and decision-making regardless of size and capacity constraints, inclusive of those spatially, and in some ways, culturally removed like the Bahamas and Belize. It could minimize the call on a country's financial resources as states would contribute existing capacity or any additional that would be developed based

on individual national needs. It may be possible to have this enterprise funded through donor countries such as the United States and the other major powers with interests in the region as such an arrangement could also facilitate the counternarcotic effort.

Operational level coordination could respond to many of the concerns raised in the research. One outcome of sharing resources and the physical separation of Caribbean countries is the possibility of building upon the developing regional military information systems network to facilitate decision-making and coordinated action without necessarily bringing personnel together in one place. Operational coordination over time also has the potential to build standing operating procedures (SOPs) that could be used for the deployment of a CARICOM force for international duty. These SOPs would be transferable to regional exercises such as Tradewinds that are already funded and this would provide opportunity for further training and exposure of regional forces.

Military cooperation could provide many advantages for the region, but the form and manner of that cooperation has to be shaped by the militaries based on the peculiar conditions in the region. The will must also exist to stay the course. The aim here would be to eventually create conditions in which coordination and the pooling of resources would be the norm. It is extremely important therefore that the proverbial seed be planted as an initial step to build trust and confidence for the cooperative effort. One possible approach to initiate this cooperation would be to utilize the forum and leadership of the Caribbean Nations Security Conference to provide an initial distilling and synthesis of ideas, probably based on a generic-missions approach, before passing direction to a regional working group for development.⁵ The working group could draw on the experiences provided by ongoing maritime cooperative effort against drug trafficking to

assist in shaping the eventual outcome and the ideas that are generated must be subjected to rigorous and wide-ranging debate. It must be emphasized that the commitment must be there to see this through; otherwise insular thinking would continue to predominate.

Contribution to the Body of Literature

This study is seen as a part of a growing willingness by military officers in the Caribbean to contribute to the writings on the military in the region. While there are books, articles and other papers that deal with the wider regional security issue, there is not much done on the military. Moving any regional issue forward in the Caribbean has required Herculean effort. Nonetheless, the fact that the issue of a regional force is still discussed today, gives hope that the ideas presented here will be challenged, all to the benefit of the people of the Caribbean region.

¹Francisco Rojas-Aravena, "The New Security Agenda in the Caribbean: The Challenge of Cooperation," 70.

²Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Humberto Garcia Muniz, "Introduction: Challenges to the Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Caribbean," 4.

³Ibid., 7.

⁴Paul Sutton, "The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean," 29.

⁵Michele A. Flournoy and Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., "Sizing Conventional Forces: Criteria and Methodology," 169.

APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review for this research paper has been laid out in a similar framework to that which has been followed in the writing of the thesis. The research has shown that while there is much material on the broad area of Caribbean security, there is not yet a significant body of work that deals particularly with the military instrument in the Caribbean. The research was divided into areas that looked at the history of security arrangements and the concepts of security that have been recommended as being pertinent for the Caribbean region. The impact of the key actors in the international environment on these arrangements was examined. How security is defined and interpreted in the region was considered so as to determine the challenges that exist to shaping formal security mechanisms in the region.

The concept of collective security and its relevance in today's borderless world was very well articulated in a number of essays. *The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics*, 1993 by Leon Gordenker and Thomas G Wiess laid out the historical context that birthed the idea of collective defense. Ian Wing's *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks*, 2000 dealt with both the concepts of collective and cooperative security. The working paper explored how developed countries had refocused their thinking on national security to take cognizance of the broadened threat environment and the non-traditional tasks that are now assigned to militaries, mainly because no other organization is as well suited for the tasks.

The history of Caribbean security arrangements, particularly since the failure of the West Indian Federation, was gleaned from a number of articles, books and on-line sources. Among these sources, Lieutenant Colonel Edmund Dillon's MMAS thesis, *In Search of an Identity*, 2001 provided a very good account of the development of the military in the region and specifically, the manner in which this development was shaped by Great Britain, the main colonial power in the region for over 150 years prior to most Caribbean countries gaining independence. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's thesis researched the issue of whether English-speaking Caribbean countries could forge an identity for themselves considering both the colonial experience and the presence of the United States in the hemisphere. The articles by Brigadier David Granger, *Security and Stability in Small States: The Caribbean Community's Achilles' Heel*, 1999 and by W. Andy Knight and Randolph B. Persaud, *Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security*, 2001 both provide good insight into the quest for integration and collective security arrangements since the end of World War 2. Brigadier Granger's piece also specifically highlights the attempts at security cooperation in light of the mercenary, session and coup challenges that the region has been faced with since the mid-1950s.

The article by Jorge I. Dominguez, *The Americas: Found and then Lost Again*, 1998 provides a context to appreciate the dispositions of the powers outside of the English-speaking Caribbean region. Dominguez offered a view of the international system as multileveled, that is global, regional and informal, and comprising a variety of actors, both formal and informal. He argued that the United States was pertinent to all three levels of the system and that Caribbean states are more likely to face threats from

the informal level of the system, where drug trafficking and its attendant consequences provide the most significant danger.

The book, *Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean*, 1996 that was edited by Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Humberto Garcia Muniz provided a broad compilation of essays that easily captured what the Caribbean has seen as its international environment. It complements the article by Dominguez. The essays detail the involvement of the United States, Great Britain, Canada and France in the Caribbean. They look at the rationale for the involvement of the major powers in the region and also detailed the specific interests of these powers and how their interaction, linked to the lack of military capacity of Caribbean states, has defined the security of Caribbean countries. The essays outline the economic, political and military threats to the region from the standpoint of the major countries and note the continuing, albeit diminished, military strategic value of the Caribbean region for these countries.

There are many authors who deal with the general security environment in the Caribbean region. *From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment*, 1998 edited by Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez and Andres Serbin covers the range of political, economic and social concerns that are contemporary in the Caribbean. Anthony T. Bryan writes on the security trends that the region should prepare itself for in the future. Bryan underscores the economic threat to be at the center of all the Caribbean's security concerns. Pertinent to this thesis, Richard J. Bloomfield argues a case for the creation of a collective security mechanism in the region, though he acknowledges that this approach would be unsuitable to deal with the transnational threats that the region has been faced with over the last two decades.

Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, 1999 edited by Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach provides a more detailed account of the region's security concerns. Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis, the idea champion behind the RSS provides his views on the obstacles to military cooperation that exist in the region. Lilian Bobea comprehensively covers the migration challenge to both the receiving countries and sending countries. The essay explores the social and economic impact of migration to the United States, Canada and the European Union. The work also underscores the negative impact on the development of Caribbean countries when there is capital flight and the best minds leave the region. Jorge Duany also presents an informative essay on migration as a national and regional security threat.

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith has contributed significant works on Caribbean security. *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean*, 1993 documents the organization, structures, capabilities and equipment of the military and paramilitary forces in the Caribbean. The work details the development of the security measures that have been in existence in the region particularly since Grenada in 1983. *His Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*, 1997 covers specifically the drug phenomena and its security implications for Caribbean states. The book covers narcotics production, money laundering and drug-trafficking operations. The second section in the book explores the corrupting effect of the drug trade, the debilitating effect of the escalation of crime and arms trafficking, and the national, regional and international countermeasures that are being taken to respond to the drug threat.

Size and Survival: The Politics of Security in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1993, edited by Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, provides an account of the problems of small

states in dealing with their security concerns. The editors note that small states seem to get attention only when there is a crisis. They note that small states need to be continually aware of their environment if they are to survive. Particularly useful to this thesis was the essay by Paul Sutton that dealt with the intertwining of politics and security in the Caribbean. The essay explores the Caribbean security context including the involvement of the United States and other extraregional powers in the region. He examines the role of CARICOM in regional security, sets out the threat agenda and then details the Caribbean response.

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH METHOD

Given the complexity of the Caribbean region, a multidisciplinary approach was taken in seeking to identify the challenges that stood in the way of creating a formal military mechanism among the states of the English-speaking Caribbean. History was valuable in tracing the evolution of military cooperation in the region to assist in determining what factors shaped the current arrangements and whether there were any holdover issues that still impact today on regional arrangements. Geography was important to understanding the geopolitics of the western hemisphere, the Caribbean region and the subregion of the eastern Caribbean both before and after the Cold War and how these conditions affected cooperative arrangements.

Both the history and the geopolitics of the region were then applied within the framework of the levels of analysis that are utilized in international relations. This framework assists in determining how countries that exist in the same environment behave differently. To address the question, the international system has to be described, changes within that system have to be noted, and then, determine how the system's attributes and the changes that take place within it affect the behavior of the entities within the system. In addition, the approach looks at the domestic make up of countries to similarly comprehend under what circumstances they would cooperate or coordinate their action with other actors in the international system. The domestic level also provides an understanding of processes that relate to the economic, diplomatic and military instruments of power.

This analytical model is further broken down at both levels. At the international level, we have noted how world politics in the Cold War era shaped relations and policies of the United States and the other major powers and various Caribbean countries. Cuba in the Caribbean region continues to be a holdover of the Cold War paradigm. At the domestic level, the research noted the manner in which the perceptions of Caribbean elites, both as individuals and in their roles as prime ministers, affected the security debate. The role that Caribbean governments and the societies of the different countries have played was evident through the discussions particularly on the OECS countries and Barbados.

Thus, this approach facilitated an examination of the interaction amongst the key actors at the different levels that have created the dilemma that drove the primary research question of this thesis, that is to understand and determine the challenges that Caribbean peoples face in creating an cohesive, effective and efficient regional military security mechanism.¹

¹James E. Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 22-28.

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